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This study describes the antecedents and consequences of the direct involvement 
of boards in forming the strategies of the organizations they serve.  If boards are involved 
directly and early in the strategic decision making process rather than being held at the 
periphery, board members may become important assets to their organizations as strategy 
makers beyond their limited contributions as monitors or advisors.  By providing a look 
inside the “black box” of decision making in board rooms, this research addresses a gap 
in the strategy and board literatures and has important practical implications for 
executives and board members who are interested in utilizing their boards to the greatest 
advantage for their organizations.  
Board members and chief executive officers who are currently making strategic 
decisions in a hospital context detailed their involvement in the decision making process 
in their responses to surveys designed for this study.  Utilizing structural equation 
modeling for analyzing these responses, this study indicates that board members who 
bring human capital, social capital, and Board Capital (human and social capital in 
concert) to the board room are more likely to participate early in the strategic decision 
making process by raising or clarifying issues, generating or evaluating alternatives, or 
choosing strategies rather than only coming into the process at the end to review and 
accept or reject the recommendations of the top management team.  And when board 
members are directly involved in forming strategy, the strategic decisions are more likely 
to be implemented and the implemented strategies are more likely to result in positive 
  vii 
financial outcomes.  Thus, boards as strategy makers impact the strategic decision 
making process and the organization in important ways.   
This study has shown that there are identifiable antecedents and positive 
consequences of boards acting as strategy makers. 
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“One of the great paradoxes of the twentieth century is that while 
enormous progress was made in understanding how economies in general 
operate and in improving the management of corporations, relative little 
was learned about the way in which the people who are by law 
responsible for the oversight of the corporations, upon which so much of 
prosperity is based, actually made their decisions.” 
  
       -- Leblanc and Gillies,  Inside the Boardroom (2005: 245) 
 
 
Executives and scholars have traditionally viewed the primary duties of boards of 
directors to be monitoring and advising the chief executive officer and top management 
team (Forbes & Milliken, 1999; Kor & Sundaramurthy, 2009).  As either monitors or 
advisors the board acts independently of the organization’s executives in a supervisory 
role.  Scholars have directed attention to the composition of boards, particularly in terms 
of the status of board members as “insiders” or “outsiders,” that enhances their 
independence.  Several organizations where boards failed in their monitoring 
responsibilities (Enron for example) received much attention in the popular press.  As a 
result of this increased public attention to the accountability of boards and executives, the 
Sarbanes-Oxley legislation was enacted in 2002.  But beyond the legislated requirements 
relating to audit committee composition and financial reporting for publicly traded 
corporations, some have called for greater involvement of the boards of all types of 
organizations in the organization’s strategic decision making processes in order for 
boards to more effectively perform their monitoring and advising functions (e.g. Chait, 
Ryan, & Taylor, 2005; Charan, 2005; Dalton, Hitt, Certo, & Dalton, 2007; Nadler, 2004).  
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When boards are involved in developing the organizational strategies from the beginning, 
they will likely have greater depth of understanding of both the strategies and the 
organizational context when they are ultimately asked to pass judgment on those 
strategies (Finkelstein, Hambrick, & Cannella, 2009).  
Even more importantly than improving boards’ abilities to perform their 
traditional monitoring and advising roles more effectively, the direct involvement of 
boards in the various stages of the organizational strategic decision making process 
increases the opportunity for organizations to capitalize on their boards as resources for 
building competitive advantage in their increasingly complex organizational 
environments (Pfeffer, 1972, 1973; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).  Since board members 
bring their perspectives and expertise from their own fields to the boardroom, their 
perspectives are potentially quite valuable in the process of determining the strategic 
direction of the organization.  These varied perspectives and fields of expertise add 
breadth and depth to the resources available for sensemaking in the face of the 
organization's complex environment.   When brought to bear in identifying problems, 
clarifying issues, generating and evaluating alternatives, and making choices—critical 
steps in the organizational strategic decision making process (Russo & Schoemaker, 
2002)—the perspectives and areas of expertise of board members are valuable resources 
for forming organizational strategy. 
This study describes the antecedents and consequences of the direct involvement 
of boards in forming the strategies of the organizations they serve.  If boards are involved 
directly and early in the strategic decision making process rather than being held at the 
periphery, board members may become important assets to their organizations as strategy 
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makers beyond their limited contributions as monitors or advisors.  This research is of 
interest because it addresses a gap in the strategy and board literatures, and it has 
important practical implications for executives and board members who are interested in 
utilizing their boards to the greatest advantage for their organizations. 
If boards are potentially important resources as strategy makers rather than acting 
only as monitors and advisors, what factors contribute to boards being involved in the 
strategic decision making process?  I propose that three constructs are the primary 
contributing factors that make boards capable of participating effectively in the strategy 
formation process: the human capital, the social capital, and the Board Capital that boards 
bring to the strategic decision making process.  Human capital is the knowledge and 
skills individuals develop as a result of their experiences, education, and training (Becker, 
1993; Kor & Sundaramurthy, 2009).  Social capital refers to the resources that are 
available to individuals as a result of their networks of relationships with others 
(Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998).   Board Capital is the combination of human capital and 
social capital (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003).    
For boards to be more capable of being involved in forming organizational 
strategy, the most important sources of human capital are the experiences of board 
members with decision making at the board level and their experiences in their work and 
educational fields.  Board experience comes from board members serving on boards 
currently or in the past.  Boards are at the apex of their organizations and are ultimately 
accountable for all organizational decisions and actions.  This is a significant 
responsibility, and board members who have more experience with this board level of 
responsibility are in a better position to assume that responsibility.  When boards are 
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comprised of members with more board-level experience, boards have a stronger 
foundation for participating in making the strategic decisions for which they will be held 
accountable.  The perspectives board members bring from their work experiences and 
educational training are also particularly cogent.  The training and work experiences of 
board members in functional areas such as marketing, finance, or management and their 
experiences with various strategic options in their home firms or other organizations 
increases the diversity of perspectives in the boardroom when strategic options are 
considered.  A great deal of research on groups has shown that diversity of perspectives 
can be beneficial for producing effective decisions (Bantel & Jackson, 1989; Bourgeois, 
1985; De Dreu & West, 2001; Hambrick, Cho, & Chen, 1996; Hoffman & Maier, 1961; 
Jackson, 1992; Nemeth, 1986; Wiersema & Bantel, 1992).    
For boards to be more capable of being involved in forming organizational 
strategy, the most important sources of social capital are the relationships developed from 
the networks among board members and the collaborative relationships between boards 
and their CEOs.   The relationships among board members develop from serving on 
boards currently and in the past as well as serving on the focal board.  Collaborative 
relationships between boards and their CEOs develop from interactions both inside and 
outside the boardroom.   When board members are comfortable in offering advice freely 
to their CEOs and when CEOs are comfortable in seeking the advice and counsel of their 
boards, the stage is set for a greater and more complete exchange of information.  When 
the relationships among board members and between board members and the CEO are 
based on friendship rather than on business acquaintanceship alone,  the friendship ties 
will further improve the conditions for exchanging information as well.    
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When boards possess both human capital and social capital in concert, this Board 
Capital makes them even more capable of being resources to their organizations in 
forming strategy.    
If boards are involved directly in forming organizational strategy, what are the 
potential benefits to their organizations?   I propose that one outcome of board 
involvement in forming strategy is the greater likelihood that strategic decisions will be 
implemented because the board members are more fully informed about the choices as a 
result of their participation in making them.  A second outcome of board involvement in 
forming strategy is that strategic decisions will be better decisions as a result of 
capitalizing on the resources of the perspectives of board members.  Better decisions are 
effective decisions, and positive financial results for the implemented strategic decisions 
are evidence of effective decisions.  Since these decisions are strategic (i.e., they have 
long-term impacts that affect the entire organization), the positive financial outcomes of 
these implemented strategic decisions will be expected to flow through to the financial 
performance of the organization as a whole. 
With this overview of the study, the following chapters delve into the substance of 
the study in greater depth.  Chapter 2 presents the foundational literature for the 
constructs incorporated in the study.  Chapter 3 describes the study research questions, 
hypotheses, and details of the research design.  Chapter 4 presents the findings from the 
data analyses.  Chapter 5 provides the discussion and practical implications, and Chapter 
6 is the conclusion. 
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CHAPTER 2  
REVIEW OF SELECTED LITERATURE 
 
“In the corporate governance debate, all arguments ultimately converge on the 
role of the board of directors” (Gilson & Kraakman, 1991: 873).   Researchers have 
directed attention at two roles in particular—boards as monitors and boards as advisors.  
However, interest is growing in the possibility that to effectively serve their organizations 
boards must assume a different, much larger role: boards as strategy makers.  As strategy 
makers, boards become a valuable resource for the organizations they serve. Specifically, 
boards are a resource because they bring human capital and social capital to the strategy-
making process.  When these forms of capital are effectively utilized, the organization 
prospers.  
This chapter describes how a board can be seen as a resource and how that 
resource might best be employed. Thus, this chapter will review current thinking on 
resources and resource dependence. Second, the chapter will define and elaborate on 
resources in the form of the human capital, social capital, and Board Capital (i.e., the 
combination of human and social capital) board members potentially bring to an 
organization. Third, this chapter argues why and how these resources can be used to 
formulate strategy.  Finally, this chapter will argue that when board resources are used to 
formulate strategy the organization will enjoy a competitive advantage that will produce 
enhanced performance outcomes.  Figure 1 depicts the proposed conceptual model of the 
relationships among the antecedents of the involvement of boards in forming 
organizational strategy and the consequences of this involvement.  All figures and tables 
may be found in the Appendices. 
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Boards as Resources 
 
Pfeffer and Salancik (1978: 163) note that “when an organization appoints an 
individual to a board, it expects the individual will come to support the organization, will 
concern himself with its problems, will favorably present it to others, and will try to aid 
it.”  Boards are often comprised of attorneys, financial experts, executives from other 
industries, and community representatives who are resources to the organization because 
of the expertise, skills, experience, and connections they possess.  Resource dependence 
theory focuses attention on the abilities of board members to provide resources of various 
kinds to the organization and also to create linkages with individuals and organizations 
outside of the organization.  Since board members are boundary spanners, they are 
important in the organization’s ability to access resources and sources of information that 
are available—possibly exclusively—in the organization’s external environment, thereby 
reducing the uncertainty the organization faces because of its need to access critical 
resources from outside its boundaries (Pfeffer, 1972, 1973; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).        
The resources board members bring to boardrooms are substantial and valuable to 
organizations which are dealing with uncertain, often turbulent, environments.  The 
various backgrounds and experiences of board members mean they bring various kinds of 
expertise and knowledge to the organization (Baysinger & Butler, 1985; Certo, 2003; 
Gales & Kesner, 1994).  Board members have expertise in law, finance, marketing, 
human resource management, medicine and so forth as a result of their educational and 
work experience in various fields.  They also possess valuable knowledge about the 
community and general environment within which the organization operates.  This 
expertise and knowledge enhances the ability of board members to provide valuable 
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advice and counsel to the organization (Carpenter & Westphal, 2001; Ford-Eickhoff, 
Plowman, & McDaniel, 2011; Lorsch & MacIver, 1989; Westphal, 1999).   
As boundary spanners, board members create linkages with important 
stakeholders (Daily, Certo, & Dalton, 1999; Hillman, Keim, & Luce, 2001; Hillman, 
Zardkoohi, & Bierman, 1999), linkages which may not otherwise be available to the 
organization if it relied instead strictly on employees for its connections.   These linkages 
among individuals and the organizations they represent create channels for 
communicating information among organizations (Certo, 2003; Davis, 1991; Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1978).  These channels of communication then facilitate the organizational 
processes for identifying and tapping into strategic opportunities. These channels also 
transmit signals of organizational legitimacy to external stakeholders with the important 
potential outcomes of improving relationships with customers or investors (Certo, 2003; 
Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). 
The basic logic of the resource dependence view is that organizations need access 
to critical resources beyond their internal resources in order to prosper.  Although the 
resource dependence view has been relatively less explored in research on boards 
(Hillman & Dalziel, 2003), the logic of the resource dependence approach has been 
supported in several studies (e.g., Birnbaum, 1984; Boeker & Goodstein, 1991; Hillman, 
2005; Hillman, Canella, & Harris, 2002; Hillman, Cannella, & Paetzold, 2000; Lester, 
Hillman, Zardkoohi, & Cannella, 2008; Mizruchi & Stearns, 1988;  Pearce & Zahra, 
1992; Provan, 1980; Stearns & Mizruchi, 1993).  As one example, in accordance with the 
logic of the resource dependence view former government officials would be expected to 
possess knowledge and networks of contacts which would be valuable to public 
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corporations.  Supporting this logic, Lester, Hillman, Zardkoohi, and Cannella (2008) 
found that public corporations were more likely to invite former government officials to 
serve on their boards under circumstances which improved the potential for the former 
government officials to bring valuable knowledge and contacts to the board:  when they 
had a longer tenure of government service, greater breadth of experience in government 
service, and more recent government service.    
Of particular importance to the current study, the results of some studies in the 
resource dependence stream of research have shown a relationship between boards as 
providers of resources and firm performance (Boyd, 1990; Dalton, Daily, Johnson, & 
Ellstrand, 1999; Hambrick & D’Aveni, 1992; Pearce & Zahra, 1991; Pfeffer, 1972).  
From the resource dependence perspective, larger boards are in a position to provide 
more resources to the organization because of the greater number of directors bringing 
their expertise to the board and the more extensive linkages with other organizations they 
represent.  Dalton, Daily, Johnson and Ellstrand’s (1999) meta-analysis of studies that 
included over 20,000 companies indicated that there is a significant positive relationship 
between board size and organizational financial performance.  This relationship held for 
both large and small firms, for different performance measures, and for boards with 
proportionately more outside directors or inside directors.  And Hambrick and D’Aveni 
(1992), looking at the issue from the opposite vantage point (i.e., a lack of access to the 
resources boards provide will be detrimental to firm performance) found that their sample 
of firms had faced difficulties in obtaining and retaining outside directors in the five years 
prior to filing bankruptcy.  These firms were unable to tap into the resource linkages of 
outside directors, resources which may have been crucial for the firms’ survival. 
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Thus boards can be seen as providing many kinds of valuable resources in the 
form of knowledge, experience, and networks of relationships to organizations, and these 
resources are crucial to the organization prospering—or perhaps even surviving. 
Boards as Human Capital 
 
Human capital is the combination of knowledge and skills individuals possess as a 
result of their experiences, education, and training (Becker, 1993; Kor & Sundaramurthy, 
2009), and it is a valuable resource for a board.  In addition to individual board members 
possessing and using their knowledge and skills on behalf of the organization, boards are 
comprised of a number of individuals and therefore incorporate a potentially broad range 
of knowledge and experiences when these individuals are combined as a group.  Stiles 
(2001: 647) noted that the human capital present on the board represents “a major source 
of competitive advantage, not only through the individual capabilities and skills of 
individual directors, but also through the unique interrelationships and set of routines 
which form the dynamics of the board.”  These dynamics include:  (1) effort norms that 
improve director preparation and participation; (2) cognitive conflict involving 
leveraging different perspectives by balancing the positives and negatives of the presence 
of differing perspectives; and (3) cohesiveness that is linked to task performance (Forbes 
& Milliken, 1999). 
Board members’ knowledge and skills enhance their ability to scan and interpret 
the environment, make choices based on their interpretations, and help management deal 
with the complexities and uncertainties surrounding strategic decisions (Rindova, 1999).  
The knowledge systems and repertoire of skills of top managers and board members are 
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based on their prior professional experiences (Bailey & Helfat, 2003; Carpenter & 
Westphal, 2001; Certo, 2003; Hambrick & Fukotomi, 1991; Kor, 2003), and these 
experiences help shape their frame of reference, perceptions, and biases (Kor & 
Sundaramurthy, 2009; Tsoukas, 1996; Westphal & Fredrickson, 2001).  Human capital in 
the form of knowledge and skills developed from experience serving on boards and 
experience in the principal occupations of board members are particularly relevant to 
understanding board and organizational performance (Kosnik, 1987, 1990; Morck, 
Shleifer, & Vishny, 1988; Olson, 2000). 
Board Experience 
 
The knowledge and skills gained from experience serving on boards are an 
important part of the human capital board members bring to the organization.  Boards 
deal with issues of strategic importance by virtue of their position at the top of the 
organization, and experience with making decisions that will impact the organization as a 
whole and that will have long-term consequences is beneficial when board members must 
make decisions about strategic issues the organization faces.  By virtue of this experience 
with making strategic decisions, members with board experience have seen that decisions 
at this level of the organization often involve a substantial passage of time—sometimes 
years—between making a decision and its full implementation.  Experience with serving 
on a board also means that members have worked with other board members, individuals 
at the same level of responsibility and authority as they, in negotiating the decision 
making process.  Furthermore, board experience means that members are accustomed to 
working with CEOs in a supervisory capacity rather than only as the colleagues or 
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subordinates of CEOs, and this type of supervisory experience is valuable to board 
members in the same way that supervisory experience is valuable to managers of people 
at any level of the organization.  
The importance of board experience is evident in the relationships found in the 
literature between longer board tenure and outcomes such as organizational proclivity to 
make strategic changes, improved revenues, and greater attention to stockholders’ 
interests. For example, Golden and Zajac (2001) argued that boards with very low 
average tenure would have less of an information base from which to draw and therefore 
would be less inclined to recommend strategic changes.  They further argued that boards 
with very high average tenure may be more committed to the status quo.  The results of 
their study of hospitals indicated an inverted u-shaped relationship in which increasing 
the average tenure of board members for low-tenure boards increases the likelihood of 
strategic change but decreases the likelihood for high-tenure boards, supporting their 
hypothesis.   Longer board tenure has also been found to be associated with greater total 
revenues in not-for-profit colleges (Olson, 2000) as well as to larger gifts from the board 
members themselves to their not-for-profit organizations (O’Regan & Oster, 2005).   And 
the average tenure of outside directors is positively related to greater board attention to 
stockholders’ interests in the form of resistance to greenmail (Kosnik, 1990).   
Of particular interest here, longer board tenure has been associated in the 
literature with board members perceiving that they have a greater ability to contribute to 
board discussions of strategic issues (Carpenter & Westphal, 2001) and with board 
members attending more board meetings and devoting more time to board activities 
(O’Regan & Oster, 2005).  Human capital in the form of board experience increases the 
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capabilities of board members to participate fully in the strategic decision making process 
because they are able to draw upon the knowledge and skills developed through other 
board-level decision making experiences and apply them to new contexts and issues.   
These board-level decision making capabilities then enhance the potential for boards to 
contribute directly to formulating strategy rather than acting only in the capacities of 
monitors or advisors. 
 
Work and Educational Experience 
  
The knowledge and skills gained from experience in the board members’ primary 
occupations are also an important part of the human capital they bring to the boardroom.  
In their seminal article Hambrick and Mason (1984: 199) argued that an executive’s 
functional background will be related to the strategies the firm employs.  They noted this 
“functional-track orientation may not dominate the strategic choices an executive makes, 
but it can be expected to exert some influence.”  Scholars have embraced this idea, and 
functional background is now the most widely cited demographic characteristic thought 
to affect corporate strategy (Jensen & Zajac, 2004).    Since the board is responsible for 
hiring the chief executive officer, the board is important in determining the functional 
background and past strategic experiences for successor CEOs of the focal firm 
(Westphal & Fredrickson, 2001; Zajac & Westphal, 1996) and in determining the 
successor’s strategy for the focal firm once hired (Westphal & Fredrickson, 2001).  For 
example, the literature reveals that CEOs with finance backgrounds prefer strategies 
involving higher levels of diversification and make more acquisitions (Jensen & Zajac, 
2004); therefore a board which prefers to see the organization pursue a diversification or 
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acquisition strategy might influence the organizational strategic direction by selecting a 
CEO based on his or her background in finance.   
 In addition to influencing strategy through the choice of CEOs, the notion that 
work experiences influence strategic choices can be applied to board members as well as 
to CEOs.  It has been argued that outside directors rely to an even greater extent on their 
prior experiences in making strategic decisions since they have less organization-specific 
knowledge than the CEO (Westphal & Fredrickson, 2001).   Westphal and Fredrickson 
(2001) showed that directors often favor strategies for the focal firm that are like the 
strategies they have experience in formulating and implementing as executives in their 
own home firms. For example, directors who have formulated and implemented a 
strategy of extensive diversification at their home firms are likely to advocate for 
diversification strategies at the focal firm when they interpret parallels in the two firms’ 
capabilities and industry conditions.  Furthermore, Westphal and Fredrickson (2001) 
argue that executives learn from the strategic experiences of firms for which they serve 
on the board as well.  So the experiences with strategies in their home firms and in firms 
for which they serve on the board become reference points or benchmarks when directors 
are determining their strategic choices for the focal firm.   
The presence of business experience is a primary rationale given by many 
organizations for inviting individuals to serve on their boards (Daily, Certo, & Dalton, 
1999; Dalton et al., 1999; Kesner, 1988) in order to capitalize on the full range of 
intellectual capital available to the firm.   The educational and training experiences of 
board members are also important contributions to the knowledge and skills they bring to 
these organizations.  Finkelstein, Hambrick, and Cannella (2009: 97) argue that it is 
  15 
reasonable to expect that the functional work experiences along with other experiences of 
individuals will form lenses through which they see problems and solutions.   The 
correspondence between functional experiences, psychological preferences, and strategic 
choices may occur because individuals are drawn to functional areas that fit their 
personalities or aptitudes, and then individuals become inculcated with a particular mode 
of thinking typical of that functional area.  Since executives tend to perceive problems 
and generate solutions based on their past experiences—both successes and failures—
executives with similar functional backgrounds tend to develop similar perspectives on 
problems and solutions because of this common lens (Jensen & Zajac, 2004). 
Since boards are comprised of a number of individuals, members with different 
backgrounds often serve on the board together.  Diversity in the perspectives of the 
individuals on boards has both negative and positive aspects.   On the negative side, 
theory suggests that diversity in perspectives will lead to difficulty in exchanging 
information because of the different perspectives, vocabularies, paradigms and objectives 
(Ancona & Caldwell, 1992; Chatman & Flynn, 2001; Kirkman, Tesluk, & Rosen, 2004; 
Lichtenstein, Alexander, Jinnett, & Ullman, 1997; Lincoln & Miller, 1979; Pelled, 
Eisenhardt, & Xin, 1999).  Diversity of perspectives may lead to lower behavioral 
integration (Carpenter, 2002; O’Reilly, Snyder, & Boothe, 1993) and to less social 
integration among the members, resulting in discord (Devine, Monteith, Zuwerink, & 
Elliot, 1991; Hambrick, et al., 1996). The lack of common decision-making routines will 
slow the decision making process (Carpenter, 2002; Williams & O’Reilly, 1998), and, 
since members do not have “shared world views” (Carpenter, 2002), this may lead to 
lower consensus on goals, competitive methods, and environmental perceptions.   
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On the positive side, however, theory suggests that diversity of perspectives will 
increase the cognitive resources of the board, enhancing the board’s capabilities to be 
innovative in solving problems.  Diversity of perspectives broadens the field of view and 
expands networks of contacts, increasing the ability of board members as a group to 
evaluate issues on multiple fronts and enhancing the opportunities to take appropriate 
actions (Bantel & Jackson, 1989; Bourgeois, 1985; De Dreu & West, 2001; Hambrick, et 
al., 1996; Hoffman & Maier, 1961; Jackson, 1992; Nemeth, 1986; Wiersema & Bantel, 
1992).  Greater task-related conflict can be beneficial when considering complex 
decisions (Carpenter, 2002; Jehn, Chadwick, & Thatcher, 1997; Williams & O’Reilly, 
1998) and can lead to productive exchanges of information among members as they 
negotiate a decision which incorporates the various perspectives of the members 
(Bettenhausen & Murnighan, 1985; Westphal & Fredrickson, 2001; Williams & 
O’Reilly, 1998).   More perspectives will provide the group with greater breadth and 
depth of information, a greater variety of skills, and greater “sociocognitive horsepower” 
(Carpenter, 2002: 277) which may lead to improved analysis of strategic options and 
strategy formulation (Alexander, Fennell, & Halpern, 1993; Bourgeois, 1985; Daily, 
Certo, & Dalton, 1999; Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1993; Jackson, Brett, Sessa, Cooper, 
Julin, & Peyronnin, 1991).  Nemeth (1986: 23) suggests that “[m]inority viewpoints are 
important, not because they tend to prevail but because they stimulate divergent attention 
and thought.  As a result, even when they are wrong they contribute to the detection of 
novel solutions and decisions that, on balance, are qualitatively better.”   
The literature provides evidence regarding the impact of diversity of work and 
educational backgrounds in top management teams and boards.  For example, 
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heterogeneity in functional background and educational level of the top management 
team relates positively to innovativeness (Bantel & Jackson, 1989) and changes in 
organizational strategy (Wiersema & Bantel, 1992).  Murray (1989) found that 
occupational heterogeneity of the top management team was negatively related to short-
term performance in the oil industry firms in his sample but not in the food industry 
firms, indicating that the impact of occupational heterogeneity may be different in 
different industries. For example, heterogeneity may be more beneficial in novel, 
complex situations and in turbulent environments and homogeneity may be more 
beneficial in more routine situations and stable environments (Carpenter, 2002; De Dreu 
& Weingart, 2003; Hambrick, et al., 1996; Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Jackson, 1992).  In 
studies focusing on boards, Goodstein, Gautam, and Boeker (1994) found fewer strategic 
changes were associated with occupationally diverse boards, but Golden and Zajac 
(2001) found that occupational heterogeneity was linked to strategic change in a 
curvilinear manner, with increasing heterogeneity predicting increased strategic change 
up to a point before turning negative.  Ford-Eickhoff, Plowman and McDaniel (2011) 
found that hospitals with boards that are characterized by a greater breadth of expertise 
are more likely to exhibit an external focus in making strategic choices.  And Carpenter 
and Westphal (2001) found that the number of functional areas in which directors had 
prior experience significantly predicted the level of board monitoring of management’s 
strategic decision making in both stable and unstable organizational environment 
contexts. 
Similar to human capital in the form of board experience, human capital in the 
form of work and educational experiences increases the capabilities of board members to 
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participate fully in the strategic decision making process because they are able to draw 
upon the knowledge and skills developed through those experiences and apply them to 
issues the organization is currently facing.   These work and educational backgrounds 
then enhance the potential for board members to contribute directly to formulating 
strategy rather than acting only as monitors or advisors. 
 
Proposition 1:  When board members possess human capital by virtue of 
having board-level experiences, business experiences, and 
educational/training experiences, they are more capable of participating 
directly in forming organizational strategy. 
 
Boards as Social Capital   
 
Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998: 243) define social capital as “the sum of the actual 
and potential resources embedded within, available through, and derived from the 
network of relationships possessed by an individual or social unit.”  Social capital is 
another origin of valuable resources for boards, resources that result from the networks of 
relationships of the board members.  Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998) further define the 
social capital concept to be comprised primarily of three, interrelated dimensions: 
structural, relational, and cognitive.  The structural dimension involves the overall pattern 
of connections among actors; that is, the presence or absence of network ties, the network 
configuration in terms of density and hierarchy, and the existence of networks created for 
one purpose but used for another.  The relational dimension refers to the aspects of social 
capital accruing from the relationships in these networks such as the development of 
trust, norms, obligations, expectations, and identification with the group.  The cognitive 
dimension involves the shared interpretations, language and systems of meaning which 
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result from shared experiences within stable, dense networks characterized by high levels 
of interaction (Boisot, 1995; Orr, 1990).   Scholars have suggested that individuals build 
social capital by filling “structural holes” when they bridge the gaps between 
disconnected others (Burt 1992) and by having strong ties with others in cohesive social 
networks (Fukuyama, 1995).  The notion that network ties provide members access to 
resources is fundamental to the social capital concept (Adler &Kwon, 2002; Nahapiet & 
Ghoshal, 1998), and thus organizations accrue social capital through members’ efforts to 
develop their own individual social capital.  Organizations clearly also benefit from their 
members’ access to knowledge, information, and a sense of purpose (Cohen & Prusak, 
2001).   
Several important benefits of social capital at the organizational level have been 
identified in the literature.  Through the encouragement of cooperative behavior, social 
capital facilitates innovative and flexible organization (Fukuyama, 1995; Jacobs, 1965; 
Leana & Van Buren, 1999; Putnam, 1993),  individual commitment to the greater good 
and to the organization (Leana & Van Buren, 1999), the acquisition of skills and 
knowledge (Podolny & Page, 1998),  and greater coherence of action (Cohen & Prusak, 
2001).  Social capital based on high levels of trust may reduce the need for monitoring 
processes (Portes, 1998; Putnam, 1993) and lower transaction costs both within the 
organization and between the organization and its customers (Cohen & Prusak, 2001).  
Strong norms of cooperation within the social network also reduce the need for formal 
controls (Adler & Kwon, 2002) and help organizations weather volatile environments 
through the sense of solidarity engendered among organizational members who are 
committed to a shared mission and vision (Cohen & Prusak, 2001).  And social capital is 
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necessary for organizations to develop dynamic capabilities (Blyler & Coff, 2003; Dyer 
& Singh, 1998) and facilitates entrepreneurship and product innovation (Chong & 
Gibbons, 1997; Gabbay & Zuckerman, 1998; Tsai & Ghoshal, 1998; Walker, Kogut, & 
Shan, 1997).      
Social capital is also important for the development of a particularly crucial 
organizational resource:  intellectual capital, or the knowledge and knowing capability of 
organizations.  It does this by affecting the conditions needed for knowledge exchange 
and combination to occur (Hargadon & Sutton, 1997; Leana & Van Buren, 1999; 
Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998).  Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998: 252) note that “it is well 
established that significant progress in the creation of intellectual capital often occurs by 
bringing together knowledge from disparate sources and disciplines.”  Norms valuing 
diversity of perspectives, openness to criticism, and tolerance of failure have been shown 
to be important in the creation of intellectual capital (Leonard-Barton, 1995).  Social 
capital, through its role in developing intellectual capital, is a pivotal component in the 
organization’s ability to develop unique competitive advantage (Leana & Van Buren, 
1999). 
Although generally focusing on the positive consequences of social capital 
(Portes, 1998), scholars have noted that social capital is not always beneficial.  The same 
strong norms and identification with others in a network which may result in improved 
group performance may also limit the openness of network members to alternative ways 
of doing things, producing a pathological “groupthink” (Janis, 1972; Leonard-Barton, 
1995; Perrow, 1984; Turner, 1976).     A side effect of high levels of social capital may 
be a restriction of access to diverse sources of ideas and information (Kor & 
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Sundaramurthy, 2009; Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998) or unthinking loyalty to shared beliefs 
(Cohen & Prusak, 2001).  As Powell and Smith-Doerr (1994: 393) put it, the “ties that 
bind may also turn into ties that blind.”  Therefore, organizations which make effective 
use of social capital must constantly balance the benefits of social capital and its potential 
downside (Boland & Tenkasi, 1995; Etzioni, 1996; Leonard-Barton, 1995; Nahapiet & 
Ghoshal, 1998) in much the same way that the benefits of diversity of perspectives must 
be balanced with the potential disadvantages.   
Social capital in the form of networks of board members and a collaborative 
relationship between board members and their CEOs are particularly relevant to 
understanding board and organizational performance (Carpenter & Westphal, 2001; Kor 
& Sundaramurthy, 2009).  
Networks   
 
The complex world today makes it impossible for any one individual to know 
everything important for running any organization.  Networks of relationships—although 
they may have been created for other purposes—provide channels through which 
information flows, reducing the costs involved in gathering information (Coleman, 1988).  
Networks produce these efficiencies in information transfer by providing an information 
screening and distribution process for the network members, transmitting information 
sooner to network members than they would receive it without those contacts, and 
providing the opportunity for members to exchange knowledge (Burt, 1992).  Networks 
are the “incubators” of collaboration and affect the range of information that may be 
accessed by network members (Cohen & Prusak, 2001).  By means of network 
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connections, individuals may gain privileged access to information and opportunities as 
well as social status if membership in the network is restricted (Burt, 1992; D’Aveni & 
Kesner, 1993).  Through these networks, individuals become connected not only directly 
with other people who have the ability to help them but also indirectly with the resources 
these contacts can provide through their own networks (Adler & Kwon, 2002). 
Networks are valuable assets because of the access they provide members to 
power, information, and knowledge.  A sense of membership in the network comes from 
learning what the network knows through sharing skills, language, and information 
(Cohen & Prusak, 2001).  These networks of relationships give rise to obligations and 
expectations for actions in the future due to feelings of gratitude, respect or friendship 
among members (Bourdieu, 1986; Coleman, 1990)   These obligations and expectations 
provide motivation for exchanging knowledge and acting cooperatively (Lewicki & 
Bunker, 1996; Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998).   Furthermore, these norms, obligations, and 
expectations may be important in the process of individuals identifying themselves as 
part of a group,  taking the values or standards of other individuals as their frame of 
reference (Merton, 1968; Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998; Tajfel, 1982).  
Disparate sources of information and differences of opinion expand knowledge 
bases, but meaningful communication among the diverse parties is an essential part of the 
social exchange process.  High levels of social capital are typically developed in contexts 
with high levels of interaction and interdependence among people in which the linkages 
are strong and reciprocal (Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998).   High levels of interaction lead to 
network members developing a common language, and sharing a common language 
facilitates access to others and to the information they possess.  Shared vocabularies bind 
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members together and make conversing more efficient (Cohen & Prusak, 2001).  This 
shared language enables combining information from disparate sources (Boland & 
Tenkasi, 1995) and also enables the formation of shared stories, powerful means of 
communicating information among members and preserving rich meanings (Cohen & 
Prusak, 2001; Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998). 
The literature provides several insights about networks with respect to boards.  
Whether individuals are asked to serve on a board is often a function of the personal 
connections of the individuals with others in the business elite (Davis, 1993; Mintzberg, 
1983) as much as the performance of the individuals as executives in their own firms 
(Brickley, Linck, & Coles, 1999) and their performance in their roles as board members 
of other firms (Coles & Hoi, 2002; Farrell & Whidbee, 2000; Westphal & Stern, 2007).  
In a recursive manner, an individual’s position within this business elite is at least partly 
determined by the directorships he or she holds (Allen, 1974; Davis, 1993; Koenig, 
Gogel, & Sonquist, 1979; Porter, 1957).  Since networks create channels through which 
information flows, the network formed by overlapping memberships on different boards 
of directors can be a mechanism for spreading techniques and innovations in governance 
(Davis, 1991; Haunschild, 1994; Westphal, 1999) and the policies underlying strategic 
decisions (Westphal, Seidel, & Stewart, 2001) from board to board.  And longer tenure 
on a board provides the opportunity to become familiar with other board members and 
with the top management team, leading to the development of a common language (Kor 
& Sundaramurthy, 2009) which facilitates the discussion of organizational issues and 
strategies. 
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Social capital developed from the networks of board members increases the 
capabilities of board members to participate fully in the strategic decision making process 
because they are able to tap into the channels of information their networks provide, at 
the same time extending the information available for making strategic choices for the 
organization and reducing the costs of accessing that information.   Board members are 
motivated to exchange information because of the expectations developed from their 
participation in their various networks and their identification with other members of 
these networks.  And the shared languages that develop from interactions in their 
networks enable combining information from disparate sources in new ways to benefit 
the organization.  In these ways, the networks of board members enhance the potential for 
boards to contribute directly to formulating strategy. 
Collaborative Relationship with the CEO   
 
In addition to the social capital in the form of relationships of board members 
with others in their networks, a collaborative relationship between the board members 
and their CEO is evidence of social capital, particularly the relational and cognitive 
dimensions of social capital.  Trust is an essential ingredient for a collaborative 
relationship to develop between boards and their CEOs.  Trust involves confidence in the 
good intent of others in the exchange process (Ouchi, 1981; Pascale, 1990; Ring & Van 
de Ven, 1994) and belief in their competence and reliability (Giddens, 1990; Ouchi, 
1981; Sako, 1992; Szulanski, 1996).  Trust is a precondition for the development of 
social capital because the essential connections among people will not form without some 
level of confidence in the good intent of others.  Personal contacts among people over 
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time provide opportunities for trust to grow as people evaluate how reliably others 
behave and whether they seem well-intentioned (Cohen & Prusak, 2001). 
Building social capital is a complex recursive process in which social capital is 
both created and used.  For example, in relationships where the parties trust one another, 
they are more willing to cooperate in activities, and, as a result of successful cooperative 
action, they develop higher levels of trust in one another (Fukuyama, 1995; Putnam, 
1993; Tyler & Kramer, 1996).  Trust of others within those relationships may then lead to 
the development of norms of cooperation, or “expectations that bind” (Kramer & 
Goldman, 1995), so that people are more willing to interact, cooperate and exchange 
information because that is the norm within those relationships (Fukuyama, 1995; 
Gambetta, 1988; Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998; Putnam, 1993, 1995; Ring & Van de Ven, 
1992, 1994; Tyler & Kramer, 1996). The frequency and intensity of interactions provide 
the opportunity for cooperating and exchanging information (Kor & Sundaramurthy, 
2009), and these interactions also provide the opportunity for a sense of identification 
with the group or organization to develop (Lewicki & Bunker, 1996; Nahapiet & 
Ghoshal, 1998). The trust engendered when board members and CEOs are familiar with 
one another mitigates the need for potentially dysfunctional impression management 
efforts by CEOs (Sundaramurthy & Lewis, 2003), and trust improves people’s ability to 
deal with complexity and diversity in contexts of high ambiguity and uncertainty (Boisot, 
1995; Luhmann, 1979).         
Westphal and his colleagues have explored this notion of collaborative 
relationships between boards and their CEOs extensively, and some of these studies have 
focused on the outcomes of boards and their CEOs sharing a collaborative relationship.  
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Westphal (1999) found that stronger CEO-director social ties lead to the board providing 
more advice and counsel to the CEO, and this collaborative relationship between CEOs 
and directors leads to higher firm financial performance.  Gulati and Westphal (1999) 
found that CEOs seeking advice and counsel from directors leads to strong cooperative 
relationships, and these strong cooperative relationships between the CEO and directors 
lead to increased likelihood of forming a joint venture alliance based on board interlocks 
because the close relationships build trust and confidence among the parties.  Westphal 
and Fredrickson (2001: 1132), arguing that “new CEOs are primarily responsible for 
implementing strategies conceived by the board,” found that boards selected successor 
CEOs who had prior experience with strategies similar to the strategies employed by the 
directors’ home firms.  And McDonald, Khanna, and Westphal (2008) found that CEOs 
were more likely to seek advice from other CEOs who are dissimilar from them in terms 
of their functional backgrounds and social networks when the CEOs and their boards 
have a collaborative relationship.  This increased likelihood of CEOs seeking advice from 
dissimilar others then leads to improved firm performance.   
 Social capital in the form of collaborative relationships between boards and their 
CEOs increases the capabilities of board members to participate fully in the strategic 
decision making process because the trust in the competence and good intentions of the 
CEOs and board members involved in these collaborative relationships engenders a 
greater willingness to cooperate and exchange information.  With these collaborative 
interactions with their CEOs, board members are more likely to have access to 
organization-specific information—positive and negative—because of this greater 
willingness to share information among the parties in the collaborative relationship.  And 
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board members are more likely to identify with the organization because of these 
collaborative relationships as well.  In these ways, these collaborative relationships 
between boards and their CEOs enhance the potential for boards to contribute directly to 
formulating organizational strategy. 
 
Proposition 2:  When board members possess social capital by virtue of 
having extensive networks and collaborative relationships with their 
CEOs, they are more capable of participating directly in forming 
organizational strategy. 
 
Boards as Board Capital 
 
Boards are groups and therefore can benefit from pooling the resources provided 
by their members:  human capital (i.e., experience, expertise, reputation); social capital 
(i.e., access to information and knowledge derived from networks of relationships); both 
human and social capital (Kor & Sundaramurthy, 2009).  For example, Kor and 
Sundaramurthy (2009) describe how boards comprised of board members serving on 
multiple boards and board members having firm-specific knowledge contribute to greater 
board human capital and social capital simultaneously.  Membership on multiple boards 
exposes board members to a variety of strategic issues, problems and potential solutions, 
giving them experience in dealing with diverse issues and increasing their human capital.  
Social capital is also increased when board members are connected to many other board 
members and executives as a result of their service on multiple boards.  And board 
members’ tenure on the focal board increases their firm-specific knowledge resulting in 
higher levels of human capital.  This tenure on the focal board also increases their 
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opportunities to form connections with the other board members on the focal board 
resulting in higher social capital.  
Hillman and Dalziel (2003) refer to this combination of board members’ human 
capital and social capital as Board Capital, depicted in Figure 2.  They argue that the 
ability of boards to provide resources in various forms to the organization hinges on their 
Board Capital.   
Board Capital—this combination of human capital and social capital—is 
important above and beyond each form of capital considered separately.  After all, boards 
may be rich in human capital as a result of the backgrounds and experiences of board 
members without being rich in social capital if members do not have extensive networks 
with others.  To illustrate, a board comprised of several research scientists who have great 
expertise in their fields but who choose to live and work in isolation might enjoy high 
levels of human capital but not social capital.  Alternatively, boards may be rich in social 
capital because of the extensive contacts of board members without necessarily being rich 
in human capital.  Again to illustrate, boards comprised of several affluent socialites who 
have extensive social networks but who have little or no work experience might enjoy 
high levels of social capital but not human capital.   Boards rich in Board Capital are so 
because they enjoy the benefits of both human capital and social capital. Such boards  
ought to be  even more capable when participating  in the strategic decision making 
process because they bring more total resources to a strategy-making event than do 
boards benefiting from only one type of capital. 
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Proposition 3:   Board members possessing Board Capital (i.e., both 
human and social capital) will be the most capable of participating directly 
in forming organizational strategy. 
 
Boards as Strategy Makers 
 
The human capital and social capital resources board members bring to the 
boardroom make board members capable of participating fully in the organizational 
strategic decision making process rather than being relegated to the periphery as monitors 
and advisors.  Board Capital also means that boards are an important channel for 
organizations to use to access information about their environments and the strategic 
opportunities that exist there (Carpenter & Westphal, 2001; Fredman, 2002; Pfeffer, 
1991; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).   The expertise, experience, and networks that Board 
Capital represents are crucial resources for organizations to utilize in the process of 
determining their strategic direction and put boards in the position to be important 
contributors to this process (Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1990; Geletkanycz, Boyd, & 
Finkelstein, 2001; Geletkanycz & Hambrick, 1997; Judge & Zeithaml, 1992; Lorsch & 
MacIver, 1989).   Organizations which see their boards only as monitors or advisors are 
not capitalizing on their boards as the valuable resources they are capable of being for 
forming strategy for the organization.  Tapping the board as a resource for forming 
organizational strategy is of particular interest to researchers and practitioners alike 
(Finkelstein, Hambrick & Cannella, 2009; Johnson, Daily, & Ellstrand, 1996; Judge & 
Zeithaml, 1992; Lorsch & MacIver, 1989; Zahra & Pearce, 1989). 
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The literature provides evidence that some—but certainly not all—boards are 
significantly involved in determining the strategy of their organizations in a variety of 
industries and in for-profit, not-for-profit, and international contexts.  For example, Judge 
and Zeithaml (1992) found that approximately 30 percent of the boards in a sample 
drawn from hospitals, biotechnology firms, textile firms, and highly diversified Fortune 
500 firms reported that the board worked with management to develop strategic choices.  
Pearce and Zahra (1991) found that almost half of the boards in their sample of large 
manufacturing and service corporations had significant power in making decisions about 
corporate strategies.  Similarly, Lee, Alexander, Wang, Margolin, and Combes (2008) 
found that 60 percent of the hospital boards in their sample reported a high focus on the 
board’s strategy/mission setting role.  And in an international context, Iecovich (2004) 
found that approximately 30 percent of the respondents in her sample of nonprofit 
organizations in Israel reported the highest level of board involvement in deciding and 
implementing strategic changes in programs and services.    
Several studies focusing on how and when boards are involved in the strategy 
formation process have found relationships between the characteristics of the members of 
the board and the organizational strategic choices made.  Much of this stream of research 
focuses on board members as either “insiders” or “outsiders” to distinguish their level of 
independence.  Insiders are generally defined as current and former employees or 
sometimes as individuals with any affiliations with the organization, and outsiders have 
no such affiliations (Cochran, Wood, & Jones, 1985).  Outside director representation has 
been associated with the involvement of boards in making acquisition and restructuring 
decisions (Johnson, Hoskisson, & Hitt, 1993), and the proportion of insiders on the board 
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is negatively related to board involvement in the strategic decision making process (Judge 
& Zeithaml, 1992).  Outside director representation has also been associated with a 
greater tendency to choose organizational diversification strategies (Hill & Snell, 1988),  
lower strategic emphasis on research and development (Baysinger, Kosnik, and Turk, 
1991; Deutsch, 2005; Hill & Snell, 1988) and greater emphasis on strict adherence to 
environmental laws in order to avoid the costs associated with infractions (Kassinis & 
Vafeas, 2002). Also, the arrival of new outside directors makes a firm’s decision to divest 
a poorly performing subunit more likely (Shimizu & Hitt, 2005).     
The strategic experience of outside directors in their home firms has been found 
to be an important factor in determining the strategic direction of the focal organization, 
evidenced by the board selecting a CEO who has experience with strategies similar to the 
directors’ home firms and who then implements similar strategies in the focal 
organization (Westphal & Fredrickson, 2001).  Along those same lines, Haunschild 
(1993, 1994) found the acquisition experience of directors in their home firms was 
positively associated with acquisition activity in the focal firm.  
When exploring how and when boards are involved in forming organizational 
strategy, some scholars have focused on the capabilities of board members to be involved 
in making strategic decisions.  Carpenter and Westphal (2001) argued that experience on 
other boards will likely affect the degree to which directors have suitable knowledge and 
information in order to contribute meaningfully to strategy formation.  They argued that 
strategy implementation will be more important than strategy development in stable 
environments, and therefore appointing directors who also serve on the boards of other 
firms which follow similar strategies in similar contexts would increase the directors’ 
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abilities to contribute to strategic decisions in stable environments.    In contrast, in 
unstable environments familiarity with different strategies in different contexts will likely 
be more beneficial to the directors’ ability to contribute to strategic decisions.  They 
found support for these hypotheses in their study of outside directors of Fortune 1000 
firms.  Similarly arguing that knowledge of different technologies and skills in portfolio 
management are needed to successfully make diversification decisions, Pearce and Zahra 
(1992) found that greater outsider representation on boards was associated with greater 
organizational diversification.   
A few studies have explored the capabilities of board members to be involved in 
strategic decision making from the perspective of the human capital or social capital they 
bring to the board.  For example, Kor and Sundarmurthy (2009) found in their study of 
entrepreneurial firms in the U.S. that various forms of firm- and industry-specific human 
capital and social capital represented on the board influenced the growth strategies of 
these firms.  Stevenson and Radin (2009) found that the social capital of board members 
in the form of more prior relationships with other directors, more current ties with other 
directors, and ties with members of a dominant coalition within the board was the biggest 
predictor of the members’ influence on board decision making.   They argued that the 
strong ties among the board members may lead to higher levels of trust overall on the 
board, and board members with more connections within the board then have greater 
influence on board decisions.  And Westphal and Milton (2000) found that directors who 
were in the minority in terms of functional/industry/educational background, race or 
gender relative to the board as a whole had more influence over board decision making 
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when they had higher social capital as a result of strong social connections with majority 
directors through common board memberships.   
 This literature reveals that research directed at the question of how boards impact 
organizational strategy has provided evidence that boards have been involved in setting 
strategic direction in a variety of contexts.  However, board involvement in forming 
strategy is a complex issue.   There are three levels of board involvement in strategic 
decision making: (1) approving/disapproving strategic decisions made by the top 
management team; (2) shaping strategic decisions; and (3) directly deciding the content, 
context, and conduct of strategy (McNulty & Pettigrew, 1999).  The first level is 
associated with boards acting as monitors, and the second level is associated with boards 
acting as advisors. When boards are involved at the third level and are directly forming 
strategy, they are involved to a greater extent in making strategic choices than is the case 
for either monitors or advisors—they are acting as strategy makers.  
Adding to the complexity of the issue, there are stages in the strategic decision 
making process including identifying the problem, clarifying the issues, generating and 
evaluating alternatives, and making a choice (Russo & Schoemaker, 2002).  When acting 
as monitors or advisors, boards do not participate in these stages.  Rather, the CEO and 
top management team are involved in these stages in making decisions which will then be 
presented to the board.  However, boards acting as strategy makers are involved in these 
stages of decision making as well as the top management team, with each stage being 
subject to varying levels of board involvement.  So although the literature reports 
research which has explored board involvement in setting the strategic direction of 
organizations, Finkelstein, Hambrick, and Cannella (2009: 262) recently pointed out that 
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there is still “much that we do not know about board involvement [in strategic decision 
making].” 
  
Proposition 4: When board members are more capable of participating 
directly in forming organizational strategy by virtue of their human 
capital, social capital or Board Capital, some boards do act as strategy 
makers for their organizations.   
 
Proposition 5:  When board members act as strategy makers, boards 
participate in the stages of strategic decision making including identifying 
the problem, clarifying the issues, generating and evaluating alternatives, 
and making a choice. 
 
Boards as Strategy Makers and Organizational Performance 
 
The resource dependence view focuses attention on the premise that access to 
resources is crucial to any organization (Pfeffer, 1972, 1973; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).  
Organizations that tap into their boards as resources are developing competitive 
advantages which organizations that do not utilize their board resources to the same 
extent are lacking (Leana & Van Buren, 1999; Stiles, 2001).  Boards are particularly 
important resources to organizations in their process of forming and choosing 
organizational strategies (Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1990; Geletkanycz, Boyd, & 
Finkelstein, 2001; Geletkanycz & Hambrick, 1997; Judge & Zeithaml, 1992; Lorsch & 
MacIver, 1989), a process that is a fundamental component of an organization’s ability to 
compete and prosper. The human capital and social capital board members bring to the 
boardroom increase the capacity of the organization to make effective strategic decisions 
(Baysinger & Butler, 1985; Carpenter & Westphal, 2001; Certo, 2003; Gales & Kesner, 
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1994; Kor & Sundarmurthy, 2009; Lorsch & MacIver, 1989; Pfeffer, 1991; Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1978; Westphal, 1999).       
Human capital in the form of experience with board-level authority, 
accountability, and strategic decisions which board members bring to the organization’s 
strategic decision making process means that board members are better prepared to make 
strategic decisions for the organization.  Human capital in the form of work and 
educational experience means that multiple perspectives are brought to bear on the issues 
facing the organization rather than only the CEO’s or his or her management team’s 
perspective.  Human capital is a portion of a crucial foundation to enable organizational 
strategic decision making processes that will result in more effective strategic decisions.   
Social capital in the form of the networks board members have cultivated with 
others expands their knowledge of strategic options available to the organization.  These 
networks also expand board members’ knowledge of opportunities and threats that exist 
in the organization’s environment, improving their abilities to engage in sensemaking 
effectively.  Board members who enjoy collaborative relationships with their CEOs have 
developed a necessary level of trust in the good intentions and capabilities of their CEOs 
as well as other board members, opening channels for communicating the information 
board members have gathered from their network sources.  These communication 
channels open opportunities for board members to provide advice to their CEOs and for 
CEOs to seek their counsel.  Social capital is therefore another aspect of a crucial 
foundation to enable organizational strategic decision making processes that will result in 
more effective strategic decisions.   
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When both human capital and social capital are present in combination, the 
resulting Board Capital represents the most solid base and promising opportunity for 
boards to participate effectively in organizational decision making processes. 
Beyond the opportunity to improve the quality of the strategic decisions that result 
from the decision making process, another benefit arises when board resources are fully 
utilized. Board members are better informed of the details of the organizational context 
and of the strategies themselves when boards are involved in forming the organizational 
strategies.  This familiarity will increase the board’s confidence in the judiciousness of 
the strategies that survive the evaluation process.  Boards will therefore be more likely to 
approve implementation of these strategies when they are confident these are wise 
courses of action for the organization to take. 
Strategic decisions which are effective for the organization will lead to positive 
outcomes.  Positive results that can be traced to the implemented strategies are among the 
important outcomes organizational decision makers look for as indicators that the chosen 
strategies were effective.  Although there are many factors that may interpose themselves 
between any one implemented strategy and overall organizational performance outcomes, 
it is reasonable to expect an overall pattern of implementing better decisions will be more 
effective for the organization, thus improving overall organizational performance as well. 
Of the studies in the literature discussed earlier which have explored board 
involvement in forming strategy, only a few addressed the connection between this 
involvement and organizational performance.  Pearce and Zahra (1991) found that firms 
with boards that played a significant role in making corporate strategic decisions were 
associated with higher firm earnings per share and improved stock performance.  Hill and 
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Snell (1988) found that outsider representation on the board was associated with better 
financial performance in their sample of Fortune 500 firms, and Kor and Sundarmurthy 
(2009) found that the human and social capital attributes of outsiders were significantly 
related to sales growth in their sample of technology-based entrepreneurial firms.  
Iecovich (2004) found that the more boards were involved in making changes in 
organizational programs and services, the more sound was the organizational fiscal 
status.  Lastly, Judge and Zeithaml (1992) found a positive but weak relationship between 
board involvement in strategic decision making and organizational financial performance.    
So the literature reveals some evidence that involving boards in forming organizational 
strategy is related to improved organizational performance, but more work is needed to 
expand this empirical evidence. 
 
Proposition 6:  When board members act as strategy makers, the strategic 
decisions which they participate in forming will be implemented by the 
organization. 
 
Proposition 7:  When board members act as strategy makers by 
participating in forming organizational strategy, there will be positive 
outcomes from implementing the strategic decisions.  
 
This chapter reviewed selected literature which has explored the involvement of 
boards in organizational strategic decision making, the outcomes of this involvement, and 
the elements of human capital and social capital that may lead to greater involvement of 
boards in organizational strategic decision making.  With this previous research as a 
foundation, the next chapter will describe the hypotheses of interest, sample and 
methodology for this study. 




This study explores the antecedents and consequences of the involvement of 
boards in the process of forming strategy for their organizations in order to expand our 
understanding of boards as strategy makers rather than thinking of them only in their 
traditional roles as monitors or advisors.  This chapter describes the research questions, 
the hypotheses, the research design, the research variables, the participants, the research 
instruments, the data collection procedures, and the data analysis method for the study.  
Research Questions 
 
There are two primary research questions in this study.  First, if boards of 
directors are  potentially crucial resources to organizations as the resource dependence 
view suggests, what factors lead to boards being directly involved in forming the 
strategies of their organizations rather than being relegated to the periphery of the 
strategic decision making process?  And secondly, are there benefits to organizations 
when their boards are involved in forming strategy rather than only monitoring or 
advising the top management team members as they make the organizational strategic 
decisions?   Chapter 2 offered propositions relating to these two broad research questions, 
and the hypotheses discussed in the next section describe how the questions will be 
addressed in this study in detail. 
Research Hypotheses 
 
For boards to be effective strategy makers, boards must be capable of recognizing 
issues, developing alternative strategic options, evaluating those alternatives and making 
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strategic choices.  As discussed in chapter 2, the levels of human capital, social capital, 
and Board Capital (i.e., the combination of human capital and social capital) that boards 
possess impact their capabilities to be effectively involved in strategic decision making.  
Two forms of human capital—the knowledge and skills developed from board 
experiences and those developed from work and educational experiences—are 
particularly important.  Also, two forms of social capital—the networks of relationships 
among board members and the collaborative relationship between boards and their 
CEOs—are of particular interest.  If boards are more capable of being involved in 
forming strategy by virtue of their human capital, social capital, or Board Capital, they 
are in a position to participate directly in the strategic decision making process. And, 
because of these superior capabilities incorporated into the process of forming strategy, 
we might expect positive outcomes for the organization from involving boards in the 
decision making process.  These proposed relationships among the variables of interest 
are shown in Figure 3 and discussed in detail in the remainder of this section. 
Human Capital  
    
The experiences of board members with decision making at the board level added 
to their work and educational experiences create human capital.  Human capital in the 
form of extensive experience in making decisions at the board level increases the board 
members’ capabilities to make strategic decisions in other contexts.  This board-level 
experience may come from the board members serving on other boards currently or from  
past board service.  Board members having human capital in the form of business work 
experiences and extensive educational experiences also leads to greater capabilities for 
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making strategic decisions.   Similarly, board members with experience with a variety of 
strategies either as a result of their experiences in their home firms or from serving on 
other boards bring more knowledge to the strategic decision making process.  The 
perspectives developed as a result of these work and educational experiences allow board 
members to make valuable contributions to the process of raising issues, developing 
alternatives, evaluating alternatives, and making strategic choices.   
Board members with greater human capital will be more capable of forming 
strategy, and these capabilities will mean that boards are more valuable as resources to 
their organizations for forming organizational strategy.  Organizations that see their 
boards as valuable resources will be more likely to tap into these resources by involving 
them in forming organizational strategy.  When boards are involved in forming strategy, 
they participate in one or more of the stages of strategic decision making including 
identifying the problem, clarifying the issues, generating and evaluating alternatives, and 
making a choice.  When boards are not involved in forming strategy but rather are acting 
only as monitors or advisors, they remain at the periphery of the decision making process 
and do not participate in these stages of decision making (see Figure 4).  Since board 
members with more human capital will be more capable of being involved in strategic 
decision making, they will be more likely to characterize their boards as highly focused 
on organizational strategic decision making relative to other roles. 
 
Hypothesis 1:  Board members with greater human capital (i.e., board-
level experience, business work experience, educational experience , and 
experience with different business strategies) are more likely to participate 
in strategic decision making by raising or clarifying issues, generating or 
evaluating alternatives, or choosing strategies. 
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Hypothesis 2:  Board members with greater human capital (i.e., board-
level experience, business work experience, educational experience, and 
experience with different business strategies) are more likely to 




Social Capital   
 
Social capital arises from relationships with others.  Board members who have 
extensive networks with other individuals with board experience have the opportunity to 
draw upon the board-level experiences of others as well as their own.  These connections 
may be based on current associations with other board members or from associations on 
boards in the past when those connections are maintained beyond the term on the board.  
The relationships are opportunities for board members to develop trust, expectations, and 
identification with other individuals with board-level experience and to develop shared 
interpretations and language about organizational contexts and strategic issues.  This 
exponentially greater exposure to issues and strategic choices improves the members’ 
capabilities to be involved in forming strategy.  
In addition to the social capital accruing from networks with other board 
members, the relationship between boards and their CEOs is another source of social 
capital.  Boards which have developed collaborative relationships with their CEOs are in 
more frequent contact with their CEOs both in terms of board meetings and contacts 
outside of board meetings. Trust in the competence and reliability of all parties is 
important in developing collaborative relationships of this kind, and collaborative 
relationships are characteristically ones in which board members offer their advice and 
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counsel and CEOs seek that advice and counsel as well. The existence of collaborative 
relationships with their CEOs added to their relationships with other board members 
results in board members being more capable of being effectively involved in forming 
strategy. 
Similar to human capital, boards comprised of members with greater social capital 
will be more capable of forming strategy, and these capabilities will mean that boards are 
more valuable as resources to their organizations for forming organizational strategy.  
And organizations that see their boards as valuable resources will be more likely to tap 
into these resources by involving them in forming organizational strategy.  Again, boards 
which are forming strategy will participate in one or more of the strategic decision 
making stages rather than only evaluating the strategic decisions of the top management 
team and will focus on this strategic decision making role. 
Hypothesis 3:  Boards characterized by greater social capital (i.e., 
networks with other board members and collaborative relationships with 
their CEOs) are more likely to participate in strategic decision making by 
raising or clarifying issues, generating or evaluating alternatives, or 
choosing strategies. 
 
Hypothesis 4:  Board members with greater social capital (i.e., networks 
with other board members and collaborative relationships with their 
CEOs) are more likely to characterize their boards as highly focused on 




   
Human capital (i.e., board-level experiences and work/educational experiences) 
and social capital (i.e., board member networks and collaborative board/CEO 
relationships) individually increase the capabilities of boards to be involved in forming 
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strategy.  Boards with greater human capital and social capital in concert, or in other 
words with greater Board Capital, will be the most capable of forming strategy and will 
therefore be the most likely to be involved in forming strategy as organizations tap into 
their boards as resources.  
 
Hypothesis 5:  Boards characterized by greater Board Capital (i.e., greater 
human capital plus greater social capital in concert) are more likely to 
participate in strategic decision making by raising or clarifying issues, 
generating or evaluating alternatives, or choosing strategies than boards 
with human capital or social capital alone. 
 
Hypothesis 6:  Board members with greater Board Capital (i.e., greater 
human capital plus greater social capital in concert) are more likely to 
characterize their boards as highly focused on organizational strategic 
decision making than boards with human capital or social capital alone. 
 
Performance Outcomes  
 
Boards as monitors are evaluating the decisions about organizational strategy 
made by the top management team.  As a result, board members may have limited 
understanding of the issues or the organizational context that created the need for the 
strategic decisions.  Boards as advisors also remain at the periphery of the decision 
making process and therefore similarly may not thoroughly understand the issues and 
context.  However, boards as strategy makers are involved directly in the strategic 
decision making process by raising issues, developing alternative options for 
consideration, evaluating the alternatives, or making choices.   This direct involvement in 
the strategic decision making process means that boards have a more thorough 
understanding of all aspects of the decision situation, and this familiarity will lead to a 
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greater propensity for boards to implement the strategic decisions they have been 
involved in making.   
Board members bring a variety of backgrounds, experiences and perspectives to 
the decision making process, and one theoretical perspective suggests this diversity of 
perspectives will lead to better strategic decisions.  Positive outcomes of the implemented 
strategic decisions, including positive financial outcomes, are indicators of the 
effectiveness of the decisions.   
Hypothesis 7:  When boards participate in one or more of the stages of 
strategic decision making by raising issues, clarifying issues, generating or 
evaluating alternatives, or choosing strategies, the resulting strategic 
decisions are more likely to be implemented. 
 
Hypothesis 8:  When boards participate in one or more of the stages of 
strategic decision making by raising issues, clarifying issues, generating or 
evaluating alternatives, or choosing strategies, the implemented strategic 




In order to gather data on the involvement of boards in forming strategy to 
address these hypotheses, this study employs a cross-sectional survey research design 
using the general medical and surgical hospital industry in the United States as the 
organizational context.  Hospitals face a dynamic environment in which hospital 
strategies must address changes in health care financing, complexity in health care 
delivery, changes in physician-hospital relationships, rapid technological advances, 
intense competitive pressures, and concerns about access, quality, and cost (Alexander, 
Weiner, & Griffith, 2006; Fennell & Alexander, 1993).   Therefore the hospital context is 
well suited for exploring the process of forming organizational strategy in the face of 
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rapid changes in the organizational competitive environment.  The survey method is also 
well suited for this study because it facilitates asking individuals who are currently 
involved in the strategic decision making process in hospitals questions that are designed 
specifically to address the study hypotheses rather than relying on secondary data and 
surrogate measures. 
The following sections further describe elements of the research design for this 
study, including the research variables, participants, research instruments, data collection 
procedures, and data analysis method. 
Research Variables 
 
Addressing the study hypotheses will involve several independent and dependent 
variables connected by the mediating variable of board involvement in forming strategy.  
This section presents the specific operationalizations of these variables.   
Independent Variables  
  
The independent variables of the study are human capital, social capital and 
Board Capital.   
Human capital in this study is comprised of the knowledge and skills developed 
from the board experiences and work experiences of board members.  Board experiences 
are measured as the combined total number of years that board members have served on 
boards other than the focal board, and these board experiences may be from serving on 
other boards currently or in the past.  Work/educational experiences are measured as 
experiences in business-related functional areas such as finance, planning, and 
management, experiences in educational programs such as  undergraduate, master, and 
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doctoral degree programs, and experiences with different business strategies identified in 
the Miles and Snow (1978) typology that board members have accrued through their 
work at their home firms or board service. The Miles and Snow (1978) "defender" 
strategy is characterized by offering a relatively stable set of products and services and 
focusing on the existing market domain. The "analyzer" strategy is characterized by 
monitoring the actions of other organizations that are first movers when evaluating 
promising new products or services and following their lead with products or services 
that compete with the earlier entries in some competitive facet such as cost efficiencies.  
The "prospector" strategy is characterized by being a first mover and responding rapidly 
to market opportunities.  And the "reactor" strategy is characterized by a lack of a 
consistent pattern in the strategic approach.  
Social capital in this study is comprised of relationships developed through 
networks with other individuals who have board experience and through collaboration 
with the CEO of the focal organization.  Board networks are measured in terms of the 
three dimensions (structural, relational, and cognitive) identified by Nahapiet and 
Ghoshal (1998).  The structural dimension, the overall pattern of connections among 
board members, is measured as the total number of other boards on which the board 
members currently serve or have served in the past.  The relational dimension, which 
involves the development of trust, expectations, and identification with others, is 
measured as the number of friendship ties among board members on the focal board.  
And the cognitive dimension, the shared interpretations, language and systems of 
meaning which result from high levels of interaction within the group, is measured as the 
number of years board members have served on the focal board.  Collaborative 
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relationships between boards and their CEOs are measured as the frequency of contacts 
both during and outside of board meetings, the frequency of board member-initiated 
advice giving and CEO-initiated advice seeking, and the number of friendship ties 
between board members and their CEOs.  
Board Capital is a summative construct comprised of the elements of human 
capital and social capital in combination. 
Mediator Variable 
   
The mediator variable is board involvement in forming strategy.  Board 
involvement is operationalized as respondents indicating that they participated in one or 
more of the stages of strategic decision making (i.e., raising issues, clarifying issues, 
developing alternative options, evaluating the alternatives, or making choices) when 
making a respondent-specified strategic decision.   
Dependent Variables 
   
The dependent variables represent the performance outcomes of the involvement 
of boards in forming strategy in terms of the implementation of strategies that the board 
has been involved in forming and the financial outcomes of the implemented strategies.  
The implementation of strategies is measured as the percentage of strategies that the 
board was involved in forming that is reported by the CEO to have been implemented by 
the organization.  The financial outcomes of the implemented strategies are measured as 
the financial outcomes on an eleven-point scale ranging from negative to positive as 
reported independently by the board members and the CEO. 
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Control Variables 
   
Since system affiliation, hospital ownership (governmental, non-governmental 
not-for-profit, or investor-owned), and hospital size may possibly affect the degree of 
involvement of boards in forming strategy, these characteristics of hospitals are control 
variables in this study.   
Targeted Participants 
 
Individuals who currently serve on the boards of general medical and surgical 
hospitals in the United States comprise the target population of interest in this study.  In 
order to include hospitals with similar environmental and regulatory contexts, the sample 
consists of the board members and chief executive officers of general medical and 
surgical hospitals that are located in a single state in the southeastern region of the United 
States.   The sampling frame, the American Hospital Association Guide to the Health 
Care Field, provides a roster of general medical and surgical hospitals by state and 
includes the contact information for the CEOs of these hospitals.  Since there is no 
centralized roster of board members for all hospitals in the state, the CEOs are the initial 
points of contact for accessing their board members in order to solicit their participation.  
Research Instruments 
 
To gather data as directly as possible from individuals actually making strategic 
decisions in hospitals, two original survey instruments developed specifically for this 
study ask participants to provide information about the strategic decision making process 
in their hospitals.  One survey instrument is tailored to the members of the hospital 
boards, and the other survey instrument is tailored to the hospital CEOs.    
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The survey items address the respondents’ current and past membership on 
hospital and non-hospital boards; the nature of their work and educational backgrounds; 
their demographic characteristics; and the experience they have had with strategic options 
categorized according to the typology developed by Miles and Snow (1978).  The survey 
items also address the nature of the hospital board focus; the dynamics of the interactions 
among board members and between board members and their CEOs; the extent of board 
involvement in the stages of decision making (i.e., raising the issues, clarifying the issues, 
generating alternatives, evaluating alternatives, choosing alternatives); the extent of board 
involvement at the periphery of the strategic decision making process (i.e., 
reviewing/questioning the CEO’s recommendations or accepting/ rejecting the CEO’s 
recommendations); and the outcomes of strategic decisions in terms of implementation 
and financial outcomes.   Table 1 shows the research variables and their related survey 
items.  
A panel of current hospital board members reviewed the original survey 
instruments for clarity of wording, length of time to complete the surveys, etc. as a pilot 
test for the study.  The panel's resounding recommendation was to substantially shorten 
the surveys so they would take ten minutes or less to complete.  Given that the study  
 participants will be busy executives who are frequently asked to respond to surveys, the 
panel's concern was that hospital board members and CEOs would not complete the 
surveys if it took much of their time to do so.  After eliminating redundancies and 
questions that were not crucial to this study, the current survey instruments are 
approximately half the length of the original instruments.  Questions were also phrased 
whenever possible so they could be answered by checking a box.  Additional test 
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administrations of the surveys indicated that the current surveys take seven to eleven 
minutes to complete. 
Data Collection Procedures 
 
I worked with the state Hospital Association for eighteen months in an effort to 
gain its support for this study before contacting hospitals in the state.  After receiving 
approval from the University of Tennessee Institutional Review Board, I called the 
administrative assistants of all CEOs in the general medical and surgical hospitals in the 
state.   In this initial personal contact, I introduced myself and described my study to the 
administrative assistants and asked for an e-mail address so I could send the study 
description and survey instruments to the CEOs.  With this personal approach, I 
attempted to gain the administrative assistant's support so that he or she would advocate 
for me with the CEO.  I e-mailed the description of my study and the online survey links 
immediately after completing each phone call. 
I asked the CEOs to participate in the study by completing the Hospital CEO 
Survey and asking the members of their board to complete the Hospital Board Member 
Survey, stressing that the surveys take approximately ten minutes to complete and that I 
will provide study summary reports to participants if they wish to receive them.  I 
provided links in my e-mails to CEOs to enable participants to complete the surveys 
online, and I also offered to send paper copies of the survey instruments and postage-paid 
return envelopes if the CEOs preferred.   By providing the option of paper copies for 
completing the surveys, individuals who may not have experience with online survey 
instruments or convenient access to the internet had equal opportunity to participate in 
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the study.  The option of paper copies may also fit the standard method of communicating 
with board members for some CEOs.  
 Research involving top executives is plagued by low response rates, response 
rates that are often less than 25% (Carpenter & Westphal, 2001), so a plan for following 
up on the initial request for participation in this study was essential.  One month after the 
initial e-mail, I contacted non-responding CEOs via e-mail again to encourage their own 
and their board members' participation.  I provided links to the online surveys again and 
stressed that the surveys should take a short time to complete.  When it was apparent that 
I could not expect further participation, I concluded the data collection phase at the end of 
2011. 
Data Analysis Method 
 
Structural equation modeling (SEM) is a statistical methodology well-suited to 
this study.  SEM facilitates a confirmatory approach (i.e., hypothesis testing) for models 
representing causal processes involving multiple predictor variables each measured by 
multiple indicators.   Unlike regression methods that are based on observed 
measurements only, SEM can be used to incorporate both latent (i.e., unobserved) and 
manifest (i.e., observed) variables.  SEM also enables assessing models incorporating 
mediating variables and multiple dependent variables.  Using SEM, the hypothesized 
model can be tested for its fit to the sample data in a simultaneous analysis of the entire 
system of variables (Blaikie, 2003; Bollen, 1989; Byrne, 2001).   
This chapter presented the research questions, study hypotheses, and details 
regarding the research design for the study.  The next chapter will provide the findings 
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from the analyses of the board member and CEO responses that resulted from the 
administration of the survey instruments. 
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This study focuses on the involvement of board members in the process of 
forming strategy for their organizations and the outcomes of that involvement.  This 
chapter describes the results of the analyses of data gathered via surveys from board 
members who are currently participating in the strategic decision making process of 
general medical and surgical hospitals in a state in the southeastern region of the United 
States.   Chief executive officers of hospitals in the same state also provided their 
perspectives on the involvement of their board members in making strategic decisions 
and the results of that involvement, and this chapter presents the results of this second 
survey of these executives as well.  
Study Participants 
 
Thirty participants identified their role as board members and completed the 
Hospital Board Member Survey designed to gather data for this study.  Fourteen 
participants identified themselves as the chief executive officers (CEOs) of their hospitals 
and completed the Hospital CEO Survey tailored to the executives.  The participants 
could choose to respond to the survey either on-line utilizing the SPSS mrInterview 
software or on paper.  All participants chose to respond on-line.  After extensive pilot 
testing and revising for clarity and efficiency, the survey instruments could be completed 
in approximately ten minutes. 
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The participating board members and CEOs represent twenty-two (22) hospitals 
from across the state, or nineteen percent (19%) of the general medical and surgical 
hospitals in the state.  These twenty-two hospitals include hospitals that are small (less 
than 100 beds), medium (100-299 beds), and large (300 or more beds) in size.  These 
hospitals also include governmental, non-governmental not-for-profit, and investor-
owned hospitals in terms of ownership.  In addition, these twenty-two hospitals in the 
sample include hospitals that are part of systems and those that are not.  Chi square tests 
revealed no significant differences between the twenty-two hospitals in the sample and all 
hospitals in the state in terms of size, ownership, and system membership. 
The participating board members represent fifteen (15) hospitals from across the 
state.  Chi square tests revealed no significant differences between the fifteen hospitals in 
the sample and all hospitals in the state in terms of size, ownership, or system 
membership.  The fourteen hospitals that participating CEOs represent were across the 
spectrum in terms of size, ownership, and system membership as well, and chi square 
tests again revealed no significant differences between the hospitals in the sample and all 
hospitals in the state.   This is an indication that the contexts within which the participants 
in the sample are making decisions are representative of the hospitals in the state. 
Surveys of executives are plagued by low response rates, response rates that are 
often less than twenty-five percent (Carpenter & Westphal, 2001).  The fifteen hospitals 
in the board member sample represent thirteen percent (13%) of all hospitals in the state, 
and the fourteen hospitals in the CEO sample represent twelve percent (12%).  As a 
comparison to these surveys for an individual’s dissertation study, a 2005 survey of 
hospital Chairs of the Board and CEOs in the United States conducted by the Health 
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Research and Educational Trust (HRET) in conjunction with and funded by the American 
Hospital Association (AHA) resulted in nineteen percent (19%) of the hospitals in the 
United States being represented in the Board Chair sample and thirty-three percent (33%) 
of the hospitals in the United States being represented in the CEO sample.  Table 2 
summarizes the hospital contexts represented in the sample.  
Although most of the hospital CEOs are voting members of their boards, it could 
be argued that including the CEOs as board members may skew the results in favor of 
board participation in the strategic decision making process and in the earlier stages of 
decision making.  I therefore took the more conservative approach and used the responses 
from the thirty non-CEO board members for the analyses. 
Of the participants who identified their primary role as board members, 
approximately 17% serve small hospitals, 60% medium-sized hospitals, and 23% serve 
large hospitals.   Twenty-three percent (23%) of the board members serve governmental 
hospitals, 27% serve non-governmental not-for-profit hospitals, and 50% serve investor-
owned hospitals.   Seventy-three percent (73%) said their hospitals are members of 
systems. 
Men comprise 87% of the board member respondents, and 93% of these 
respondents are white.  The ages of the respondents ranged from 35 to 77 years with 13% 
in their seventies, 27% in their sixties, 30% in their fifties, 23% in their forties and 7% in 
their thirties.  Board members holding an associate degree represent 3% of the sample, 
undergraduate degrees 47%, and graduate degrees 50%.  Their functional work 
backgrounds include medicine, finance, accounting, marketing/sales, planning, law, 
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information systems, and general management.  Table 3 summarizes the demographic 
characteristics of the board member respondents. 
Tenure on the focal hospital board ranged from one year to twenty-two (22) years, 
with 53% of the participants serving for five years or less.  Table 4 describes the tenure 
on the focal hospital board in more detail.  Sixty percent (60%) of the board members 
indicated they are currently serving on other boards of directors in addition to the focal 
hospital’s board, and 60% said they had served on other boards in the past. 
Board Member Participation in Decision Making 
 
The Hospital Board Member survey asked the participants to choose a strategic 
decision that they had participated in making while on the hospital board.  The board 
members indicated they had participated in strategic decisions such as deciding to 
construct a new hospital facility, purchase another hospital in the same city, and open a 
new cancer treatment center or cardiovascular treatment center.   
There are stages in the strategic decision making process including identifying the 
problem, clarifying the issues, generating and evaluating alternatives, and making a 
choice (Russo & Schoemaker, 2002).  In their role as strategy makers, 13% of board 
members indicated they had participated in raising issues initially, 50% participated in 
clarifying the issues, 10% participated in generating alternatives, 60% participated in 
evaluating alternatives, and 30% participated in choosing alternatives. 
 In addition to their role as strategy makers, in their roles as monitors or advisors 
board members review and question the CEO’s recommendations and accept or reject 
these recommendations.  Seventy-seven percent (77%) of the board members indicated 
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they had participated in reviewing and questioning the CEO’s recommendations and 70% 
indicated they had participated in accepting or rejecting the CEO’s recommendations 
regarding the strategic decision they were considering.  Table 5 summarizes this 
participation in the decision stages and post-decision stages. 
All thirty respondents indicated the decisions they considered in answering this 
question were ultimately implemented.  Ten percent (10%) reported that the decision had 
negative financial outcomes, 37% reported that the decision had neutral financial 
outcomes, and 53% reported positive financial outcomes.  Table 6 shows the percentages 
at each point on an eleven-point scale from negative 5 indicating the extreme negative 
end of the scale to positive 5 indicating the extreme positive end of the scale. 
Board Focus 
 
Many would agree that hospital boards fulfill three primary roles as depicted in 
Figure 5:  establishing the hospital’s mission and strategic direction, building and 
maintaining external relationships, and overseeing the hospital’s management team and 
performance (Lee, Alexander, Wang, Margolin, & Combes, 2008).  In terms of 
establishing the mission and strategic direction, thirteen percent (13%) of the board 
members indicated a low focus on this role, 37% indicated a medium focus, and 50% 
indicated a high focus on this role.  For the role of building external relationships, ten 
percent (10%) reported a low focus on this role, 50% reported a medium focus, and 40% 
reported a high focus.  And lastly, seventeen percent (17%) reported a low focus on the 
role of overseeing performance, 37% reported a medium focus, and 47% reported a high 
focus on this role.   
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Familiarity with Strategic Approaches 
 
The board participants were asked to indicate which of the following 
organizations most resembled their hospital’s strategic approach: 
 
Organization A maintains a “niche” within its industry by offering a relative 
stable set of products/services. Generally Organization A is not at the forefront of  
new products/services and concentrates instead on doing the best job possible in 
its existing arena. 
 
Organization B maintains a relatively stable base of products/services while at 
the same time moving to meet selected, promising new product/service 
developments.  Organization B monitors the actions of other organizations that 
are “first movers” and attempts to follow with a more cost-efficient or well-
conceived product/service. 
 
Organization C makes relatively frequent changes in its set of products/services.  
Organization C tries to be the “first mover” with new products/services and 
responds rapidly to early signals of market needs and opportunities. 
 
Organization D cannot be clearly characterized in terms of its approach to 
changing its products/services.  It does not have a consistent pattern.    
 
Seven percent (7%) of the board members indicated Organization A most 
resembled their hospital, and 77% indicated Organization B, 13% indicated Organization 
C and 3% indicated Organization D most resembled their hospital. 
When asked which of the above organizations most resembled the board 
members’ home organizations (that is, the organizations where they are currently 
employed or, if retired, were formerly employed), 17% selected Organization A, 60% 
selected Organization B, 20% selected Organization C, and 3% selected Organization D. 
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Relationships with the CEO and Other Board Members 
 
Selecting from a scale of strongly disagree (SD), disagree (D), neither agree nor 
disagree (N), agree (A) or strongly agree (SA), board members indicated the accuracy of 
several statements regarding their relationships with their CEOs and other members of 
their board.  Of particular interest, seventy-seven percent (77%) of the board members 
reported agreement or strong agreement that board members participate extensively 
during board meetings by voicing their viewpoints and concerns, eighty percent (80%) 
agreed or strongly agreed that board members frequently offer advice to the CEO about 
important decisions, and seventy-four percent (74%) agreed or strongly agreed that they 
considered the CEO to be a personal friend.  Table 7 shows the percentage of board 
members responding at each level of the scale for each statement. 
The Structural Equation Model 
 
Structural equation modeling (SEM) is an appropriate method to use in this study 
because of its ability to handle latent (i.e., unobserved) and manifest (i.e., observed) 
variables, multiple predictor variables each measured by multiple indicators, multiple 
dependent variables, and mediating variables.  The model in this study incorporates both 
formative latent variables and reflective latent variables; that is, formative latent variables 
are defined by the combination of their indicators whereas the state of the reflective latent 
variables is mirrored by each of their individual indicators.   
An example that illustrates a formative latent variable is socioeconomic status 
(SES).  Socioeconomic status is defined by the combination of an individual’s education, 
income, occupation, and residence (Diamantopoulos & Winklhofer, 2001; Edwards & 
  60 
Bagozzi, 2000).  Individuals who have high socioeconomic status are wealthier or more 
highly educated, but they do not become wealthy or educated because of high 
socioeconomic status (Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994).  If the level of education increases 
for example, SES increases by definition, but an increase in SES does not necessarily 
indicate an increase in education.  Also, formative indicators may not exhibit any 
particular pattern of correlations or no correlation at all.  If the level of education 
increases, the individual’s income, occupation or residence may or may not change as 
well.  Formative indicators are not interchangeable, and each indicator is an essential 
ingredient in the definition of the latent construct.  Therefore, omitting an indicator 
changes the nature of the construct (Bollen & Lennox, 1991).      
In this study, the latent variables human capital and social capital are defined by 
the formative indicators shown in Table 8.  Table 8 also shows the path weights for each 
indicator as it predicts its associated latent variable.  Note that the sign of the estimate is 
not important; rather it is the absolute value of the path weights of the indicator variables 
that describes the prediction.   
On the other hand, an example of a latent variable with reflective indicators is 
self-esteem.  We would expect individuals with high self-esteem to reflect that self-
esteem by agreeing with statements such as “I feel that I am as good as the next person.”   
Responding to a question on the survey does not create the self-esteem but rather is a 
reflection of the underlying latent variable (Bollen, 1989). 
In this study, the latent variables related to board member involvement in strategic 
decision making and board focus are reflected in the indicators shown in Table 9.  Once 
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again note that it is the absolute value of the path weights of the indicator variables that 
describes the prediction level. 
The outcome variables related to the implementation of strategic decisions and the 
financial outcomes of these decisions are manifest (i.e., observed) variables.  That is, the 
respondents provided these data in their responses to items on the surveys. 
Given the original sample size of 30 board members, the bootstrapping procedure 
available for the SEM analysis is appropriate because the bootstrapped sampling 
distribution is free from assumptions of multivariate normality.  Bootstrapping, a term 
derived from the expression “to pull oneself up by the bootstraps,” is a procedure in 
which multiple samples (in this case 200 samples) of the same size as the original sample 
(in this case samples of size 30) are randomly drawn with replacement from the original 
sample (Byrne, 2001).  Thus, for example, board member #27 may be in one of the 
bootstrapped samples twice and not in another sample at all.  However, each of the 200 
bootstrapped samples contains only the original data; the procedure does not impute or 
modify the responses of the board members in the original sample.   
I am particularly interested in the details of an individual board member’s 
participation in making a particular strategic decision and the outcomes of this specific 
decision.  This necessitates utilizing the board members’ responses for their involvement 
in the process and for the outcomes of the specific decision they considered in answering 
the questions on the survey instrument because independent data on outcomes are not 
available at the level of the individual strategic decisions.  In order to assess whether 
common methods bias is problematic in the data, I ran Harman’s one-factor test in which 
all variables are entered into a factor analysis to determine if a single factor accounts for 
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the majority of the covariance in independent and dependent variables (Podsakoff & 
Organ, 1986).  In this case, however, at most twenty percent (20%) of the variance could 
be the result of common method variance, well less than fifty percent (50%).  It should be 
noted also that some portion of this twenty percent (20%) of the variance could in fact be 
due to relationships other than common method variance.   Therefore, the Harmon’s one-
factor test indicates that common methods bias is not of substantial concern in these 
responses. 
Estimation of the model produced a chi square ratio of 3.341 for the default 
model.  Since the chi square ratio is influenced by sample size, various researchers have 
suggested that a ratio in the range of 2 – 5 indicates an adequate fit to the data (Marsh & 
Hocevar, 1985).  Other measures of fit indicated poor fit of the overall model to the data 
(χ²=698.3, d.f. = 209, p = .000; root mean square error of approximation [RMSEA] = 
.284; comparative fit index [CFI] = .000).  However, as Byrne (2001: 87) notes, “global 
fit indexes alone cannot possibly envelop all that needs to be known about a model in 
order to judge the adequacy of its fit to the sample data.”   Bollen (1989: 68) recommends 
checking the fit with the data “by comparing the magnitude, sign, and statistical 
significance of parameter estimates to those hypothesized in the model.  In short, the 
model implies that the data should have certain characteristics that we can check.”  The 
next section presents the results of the model estimation regarding these expected 
relationships in each of the study hypotheses.    
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Findings for the Research Hypotheses 
 
This study proposes several hypotheses regarding the antecedents and 
consequences of board member involvement in strategic decision making.   Before 
presenting the findings related to the hypotheses themselves, I will address the control 
variables.  The control variables for this study are ownership, system affiliation, and 
hospital size in the belief that these various contexts for decision making may potentially 
impact the degree to which board members will be involved in the hospital strategic 
decision making process.  The status of the hospital in terms of these control variables is 
reported in the American Hospital Association Guide to the Health Care Field.   
The ownership type is either governmental, non-governmental not-for-profit, or 
investor-owned.  When ownership type was incorporated in the model, the estimated path 
weight was not significant (-.002, p < .9) indicating that the hospital being a 
governmental entity or a not-for-profit or investor-owned hospital is not influencing the 
level of involvement of board members in the sample.  System affiliation indicates 
whether a hospital is part of a larger system of hospitals or independent.  When system 
affiliation was included in the model, the estimated weight was not significant (-.003, 
p<.7). The hospital size in this study is measured as the number of staffed beds, the 
typical measurement of size used in the hospital industry.  When size was incorporated in 
the model, the estimated path weight once again was not significant (-.006, p< .4).   
These hospital contexts reflecting ownership, system affiliation, and size did not have an 
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impact on the involvement of board members in strategic decision making in this study.   
Table 10 shows the path weights for the control variables. 
With that background, I will discuss the findings regarding the study hypotheses 
next.  The first two hypotheses, depicted graphically in figures 6 and 7, relate to the 
influence of the human capital board members bring to the boardroom. 
Hypothesis 1:  Board members with greater human capital (i.e., board-
level experience, business work experience, educational experience , and 
experience with different business strategies) are more likely to participate 
in strategic decision making by raising or clarifying issues, generating or 
evaluating alternatives, or choosing strategies. 
 
The analysis of the data relating to human capital and board member involvement 
in the stages of strategic decision making resulted in a highly significant estimate (.804, 
p<.001), providing strong support for Hypothesis 1. 
 
Hypothesis 2:  Board members with greater human capital (i.e., board-
level experience, business work experience, educational experience, and 
experience with different business strategies) are more likely to 




The analysis of the data regarding the influence of human capital on board focus 
resulted in a path weight that was not significant (-.063, p<.60).  Hypothesis 2 was not 
supported.  
The next two hypotheses, depicted in figures 8 and 9, relate to the influence of the 
social capital board members bring to the boardroom. 
Hypothesis 3:  Boards characterized by greater social capital (i.e., 
networks with other board members and collaborative relationships with 
their CEOs) are more likely to participate in strategic decision making by 
raising or clarifying issues, generating or evaluating alternatives, or 
choosing strategies. 
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The analysis of the data relating to social capital and board member involvement 
in the stages of strategic decision making resulted in a highly significant estimate (.593, 
p<.001), providing strong support for Hypothesis 3. 
Hypothesis 4:  Board members with greater social capital (i.e., networks 
with other board members and collaborative relationships with their 
CEOs) are more likely to characterize their boards as highly focused on 
organizational strategic decision making. 
 
The analysis of the data regarding the influence of social capital on board focus 
resulted in an estimate (-.305, p<.05) that was negative (i.e., not in the expected 
direction).  Hypothesis 4 was not supported.  
The next two hypotheses, depicted in figures 10 and 11, relate to the influence of 
the Board Capital (i.e., the sum of human capital and social capital) that board members 
bring to the boardroom. 
 
Hypothesis 5:  Boards characterized by greater Board Capital (i.e., greater 
human capital plus greater social capital in concert) are more likely to 
participate in strategic decision making by raising or clarifying issues, 
generating or evaluating alternatives, or choosing strategies than boards 
with human capital or social capital alone. 
 
The analysis of the data relating to Board Capital and board member involvement 
in the stages of strategic decision making resulted in a highly significant estimate (1.397, 
p<.001), providing strong support for Hypothesis 5.  When I ran the model with human 
capital alone (i.e., social capital was not included in the model), the path estimate 
between human capital and board member involvement in strategic decision making was 
.999 (p<.001).  When I ran the model with social capital alone (i.e., human capital was 
not included in the model), the path estimate between social capital and board member 
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involvement in strategic decision making was .913 (p<.001).  Therefore this analysis 
supports the hypothesis that board members with Board Capital are more likely to 
participate in strategic decision making than board members with either human capital or 
social capital alone. 
 
Hypothesis 6:  Board members with greater Board Capital (i.e., greater 
human capital plus greater social capital in concert) are more likely to 
characterize their boards as highly focused on organizational strategic 
decision making than boards with human capital or social capital alone. 
 
The analysis of the data regarding the influence of Board Capital on board focus 
resulted in an estimate (-.368, p<.001) that was negative (i.e., not in the expected 
direction).  Hypothesis 6 was not supported. 
 The last two hypotheses, depicted in figures 12 and 13, relate to the outcomes of 
board member involvement in forming strategy. 
Hypothesis 7:  When boards participate in one or more of the stages of 
strategic decision making by raising issues, clarifying issues, generating or 
evaluating alternatives, or choosing strategies, the resulting strategic 
decisions are more likely to be implemented. 
 
All thirty respondents indicated the decisions they considered in answering the 
questions on the survey were ultimately implemented.   
In order to assess this hypothesis from an independent perspective, I also asked 
the CEOs on the Hospital CEO Survey to tell me the percentage of decisions typically 
implemented if their boards were involved at each decision stage.  Fifty-seven (57%) of 
the CEOs responded that the decisions were typically implemented if their boards were 
involved in raising issues, 86% said the decisions were implemented if their boards were 
involved in clarifying issues, 64% said the decisions were implemented if their boards 
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were involved in generating alternatives, 79% said the decisions were implemented if 
their boards were involved in evaluating alternatives, and 71% said the decisions were 
implemented if their boards were involved in choosing alternatives.  Looking across the 
five decision stages, 71% of the CEOs’ responses were something greater than zero as the 
percentage typically implemented.   The average percentage of the decisions the CEOs 
said were typically implemented when their boards were involved in one or more of the 
decision stages was 68%.  These data from the board members and the CEOs therefore 
provide support for Hypothesis 7. 
Hypothesis 8:  When boards participate in one or more of the stages of 
strategic decision making by raising issues, clarifying issues, generating or 
evaluating alternatives, or choosing strategies, the implemented strategic 
decisions are more likely to result in positive financial outcomes. 
 
The analysis of the data relating to the financial outcomes of implemented 
decisions resulted in a highly significant estimate (19.399, p<.001), providing strong 
support for Hypothesis 8. 
Again for an independent perspective, I also asked the CEOs on the Hospital CEO 
Survey to tell me the typical financial outcomes of implemented decisions if their boards 
were involved at each decision stage.  Thirty-six percent (36%) of the CEOs responded 
that the financial outcomes were positive if their boards were involved in raising issues, 
43% said the financial outcomes were positive if their boards were involved in clarifying 
issues, 50% said the financial outcomes were positive if their boards were involved in 
generating alternatives, 64% said the financial outcomes were positive if their boards 
were involved in evaluating alternatives, and 57% said the financial outcomes were 
positive if their boards were involved in choosing alternatives.  Looking across the five 
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decision stages, 50% of the CEOs’ responses indicated neutral financial outcomes and 
50% indicated positive outcomes.  No CEOs indicated negative financial outcomes.   
These data from the CEOs therefore provide additional support for Hypothesis 8.  Table 
11 shows the percentages of the CEOs’ responses at each point on the scale from 
negative 5 indicating the extreme negative end of the scale to positive 5 indicating the 
extreme positive end of the scale. 
The analysis of these data indicates that the involvement of board members in the 
strategic decision making process mediates the relationship between the human capital 
and social capital of board members and the financial outcomes of the implemented  
decisions.  I performed additional analyses of this mediation to determine whether it 
represented full or partial mediation by including direct paths from human capital to 
financial outcomes and from social capital to financial outcomes.  These additional 
analyses revealed that involvement in strategic decision making represents partial rather 
than full mediation since the direct paths from human capital and social capital to 
financial outcomes were also significant. 
Figure 14 is a graphical depiction of the model showing all five supported 
hypotheses with their estimated path weights.  Table 12 summarizes the standardized 
regression weights for the paths related to all eight hypotheses.  Table 13 provides the 
means and standard deviations of the variables in the study, and Table 14 provides the 
correlations among the variables in the study. 
This chapter presented the results of the analyses of the data using structural 
equation modeling.  The next chapter provides a discussion of these findings and the 
practical implications.
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CHAPTER 5  
DISCUSSION AND PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS 
 
 
By looking at boards as strategy makers, this study expands our understanding of 
the role of boards in forming strategy for their organizations rather than acting only in 
their traditional roles as monitors or advisors.  The results of the surveys of board 
members and chief executive officers show that some board members are involved in 
forming strategy, evidenced by their participation in the stages of strategic decision 
making including raising issues, clarifying issues, generating alternatives, evaluating 
alternatives, and making choices.  These board members are indeed directly involved in 
forming strategy rather than being relegated to the periphery of the decision making 
process when they only review the CEO’s recommendations and accept or reject those 
recommendations. 
This study shows that when board members bring greater human capital or social 
capital to the boardroom, they are significantly more likely to be involved in forming 
organizational strategy.  When board members bring more human capital and social 
capital in concert, this Board Capital implies an even greater likelihood that they will be 
involved in forming strategy than when they bring either form of capital alone.  These 
forms of capital increase the capabilities of board members to act as strategy makers 
rather than serving only as monitors or advisors.    
These hospital board members and CEOs have also shown that strategic decisions 
are more often implemented when board members have participated directly in making 
them.   Board members have the opportunity to be more thoroughly familiar with the 
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issues and context when they participate early in the stages of strategic decision making, 
and this familiarity will lead to a deeper understanding of the appropriateness of the 
strategy for a given situation.  When board members recognize a match between the 
strategy and the situation, they are more likely to approve implementation of the strategy.  
One could ask “So what?”  The crucial piece of this equation is that the results of 
the board member and CEO surveys in this study have also shown a strong positive 
relationship between the implemented decisions and their financial outcomes when board 
members are involved in the early stages of strategic decision making.  Savvy CEOs will 
recognize the importance of tapping into this valuable resource by creating opportunities 
for board members to participate early in the strategic decision making process rather 
than attempting to “manage” their boards into unthinkingly following the CEOs’ 
recommendations.  Savvy CEOs will also seek the counsel of their board members 
whenever strategic decisions are under consideration and will communicate information 
fully and freely to their boards in order to enhance their board members’ capacity to 
apply their knowledge and skills to the specific situation at hand.  These respondents 
have shown that board members, as a result of their human capital and social capital, 
bring insights to the process of forming organizational strategy that pay off in terms of 
the financial outcomes of those strategies. Although many other factors can intercede 
between individual strategic decisions and overall organizational performance, it is 
reasonable to think that an overall pattern of implementing effective decisions will flow 
through to improve overall organizational performance. 
The results of this study have shown that the involvement of board members in 
the strategic decision making process partially mediates the link between the human 
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capital, social capital, or Board Capital they bring to the organization and the financial 
outcomes of the decisions they make.  That is, the human capital and social capital of the 
board members have some direct influence on the financial outcomes of strategic 
decisions, but it is the board member involvement in forming strategy that has a highly 
significant positive effect on the financial outcomes of the decisions.  So organizations 
that focus attention on ensuring that their boards are comprised of individuals with  
human capital and social capital still fall short of recognizing the true value of their 
boards when compared to organizations that not only form these capable boards but also 
ensure the involvement of their boards early in the strategic decision making process.  
The respondents clearly indicated a highly significant relationship between the 
forms of capital and the involvement of board members directly in the strategic decision 
making process, evidenced by their efforts in raising and clarifying issues, and 
generating, evaluating, and choosing alternatives.  On the other hand, the presence of 
more human capital, social capital, or Board Capital was not related to the board 
members’ perceptions of the primary focus for their boards.  It is noteworthy that these 
board members did not simply respond that their boards were highly focused on all three 
of the primary roles for hospital boards.  These boards do have different degrees of focus 
on the roles within their hospitals.  But it appears that the overall focus of the hospital 
board is being determined by factors other than the human capital, social capital or Board 
Capital the members bring to the boardroom.  It could be that the primary focus for the 
board is mandated by higher levels of governance within hospital systems or at the 
corporate level for investor-owned hospitals.  The primary focus of the board may also be 
based on the historical focus of the board or on public demands.  So essentially boards 
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may be more highly focused on building relationships with the external community or 
overseeing the performance of the top management team rather than on establishing the 
strategic direction of the hospital for reasons like these regardless of the human capital or 
social capital that the board members bring to their organizations.    
The limitations of this study invite future research in several areas.  Board 
members and CEOs who are currently making decisions within the contexts of twenty-
two hospitals in one state in the southeastern United States participated in this study so 
we should be cautious about generalizing these results to all hospitals or to other types of 
organizations.  Future research that includes responses from a larger sample of people 
making decisions in hospitals and other organizations in other parts of the United States 
or the world would add confidence that the conclusions of this study are appropriate in 
other geographical and organizational contexts.   Respondents in this study reflected on 
strategic decisions they had participated in making in the past in order to resolve 
confidentiality concerns and to incorporate lag time between the time the decisions were 
made and when they were implemented and between the implementation of the decisions 
and the financial outcomes of the implementation.  This approach has obvious benefits; 
however, incorporating this lag time also leads to potential problems of inaccurate recall 
of events that took place some time ago.  Future research that addresses decisions being 
made by board members at the present time will likely provide additional insights.  
Furthermore, additional insights will undoubtedly be gleaned from researchers observing 
first hand the decision making process as it takes place in the boardroom rather than 
relying on survey instruments.  
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  Practical Implications 
 
The results of research studies often provide information about factors that may 
lead to improved organizational performance, but these factors are then not under the 
control of organizational members or are simply not actionable.  This is not the case with 
this study.  Rather, this study has a number of practical implications, suggesting several 
steps that the committees charged with nominating board members can take in their 
organizations to improve the outcomes of strategic decisions. 
The results of this study suggest that selecting board members who bring human 
capital to the decision making process will be more likely to aid the organization in 
forming strategy.  This human capital may be in the form of board-level service or work 
and educational experience, all of which can be ascertained by those charged with 
nominating board members.  The results of this study provide even more guidelines, 
however, beyond the board, work, and educational experience of potential board 
members.  These results show that the most important characteristics in determining 
board members’ human capital is long tenure on other boards on which the individual is 
currently serving, exposure to different competitive strategies through other board service 
currently and in the past, and experience with competitive strategies in the individual’s 
home firm.  Therefore, nominating committees can narrow their focus to selecting board 
members who have more years serving on their current boards and more diverse 
experience with competitive strategies rather than necessarily attempting to find 
individuals with all of the components of human capital as it is defined here.  That is, the 
results of this study indicate these are more important sources of human capital than are 
longer tenure on boards in the past, business-related backgrounds, or more education. 
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Similarly, board members who bring more social capital to the decision making 
process will be more likely to be involved early in the strategic decision making process.  
Social capital in the form of networks with other board members and collaborative 
relationships with the organization’s executives is an important consideration.  Once 
again, however, the results of this study indicate even more finely-tuned actions that 
nominating committees may take.  The results of this study indicate that the most 
important forms of social capital are long tenure on the focal board and collaborative 
relationships with their CEOs, relationships where board members freely offer advice and 
CEOs frequently seek their counsel.  These are observable characteristics that can be 
assessed as part of the process of selecting individuals to serve on the board.  
The findings of this study not only have ramifications in terms of selecting 
individuals to serve on the board but also on board policies and processes.  Since longer 
tenure on boards is an important antecedent to board member involvement in strategic 
decision making, board policies that restrict the number of years an individual may serve 
on the focal board are potentially doing more harm than good.  Similarly, board policies 
that restrict the number of other boards on which the individual is currently serving may 
negatively affect the board member’s ability to participate in the decision making 
process.  Also board policies that attempt to structure board composition to maintain as 
much board member independence from management as possible may be sacrificing 
board member effectiveness in strategic decision making that comes as a result of 
collaborative relationships with management.   
This study suggests that board processes should also be designed to enhance 
opportunities for board members to offer advice freely and for CEOs to seek the advice 
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and counsel of their boards.  Friendship ties among board members and between board 
members and their CEOs are more important in these findings than the number of formal 
board meetings for example.  Board retreats and other mechanisms for creating 
opportunities for the exchange of ideas outside of formal board meetings are examples of 
these board processes, and this study provides evidence that these opportunities are 
important to the strategic decision making process and its outcomes.    
The results of this study have also shown that selecting board members with both 
human capital and social capital, or Board Capital, is better still in terms of the 
involvement of the board in forming organizational strategy.  Therefore, focusing on 
individuals who bring more tenure on the focal board and other boards currently, more 
experience with competitive strategies, and a disposition to share a collaborative 
relationship with organizational executives will have the best potential for setting the 
stage for more involvement by board members in the strategic decision making process.   
This greater involvement by board members in forming strategy then increases 
the potential for strategies to be implemented and for these implemented strategies to 
have positive financial outcomes.  Such outcomes are certainly worthy of considerable 
attention in the process of nominating and selecting board members.  An organizational 
strategic decision making process that too often results in a lot of talk and no action is a 
waste of some of the most valuable resources for any organization:  the time and intellect 
of the individuals involved in meetings and discussions about plans that never come to 
fruition.  This study provides evidence that basing selections of board members on the 
specific forms of human capital and social capital they will bring to the organizational 
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strategic decision making process will enhance the opportunities for the organization to 
attain such outcomes as implementing more – and more effective – strategic decisions.    
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CHAPTER 6  
CONCLUSION 
 
This study took an in-depth look at the inner workings of decision making that is 
taking place in the boardrooms of hospitals today.  People who are currently making 
these decisions reflected on actual decisions they have participated in making for their 
hospitals and provided details of the decision making process for these real decisions.  
Rather than coming into the strategic decision making process only at the end to either 
approve or reject the CEO’s recommendations, these board members indicated they are 
involved in raising issues, generating alternatives, and the other early stages of the 
process as well.  When they have human capital (particularly in the form of longer tenure 
on other boards and experience with diverse competitive strategies) or social capital 
(particularly in the form of longer tenure on the focal board and collaborative 
relationships with their CEOs), or better yet, when they have Board Capital (both human 
capital and social capital in concert), these board members are capable of participating 
directly in forming strategy for their hospitals.  And they do.  And when they are directly 
involved, the decisions are more likely to be implemented and the financial outcomes 
associated with the implemented decisions are more likely to be positive.  
Board members are important boundary spanners for organizations and as such 
are crucial resources.  Their experiences with decision making at the board level – at the 
apex of the organization – and their experiences with the competitive strategies of their 
home organizations and other organizations for which they serve on the board mean that 
board members come to the focal board with experiences that are valuable resources in 
the strategic decision making process.  Their abilities to draw upon their networks with 
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others serving as board members and collaborate with the management team of the focal 
organization puts board members in the position to offer sound advice in the strategic 
decision making process, another valuable resource.  Board members are important 
conduits for gaining access to information, experiences with strategic options, and 
connections in the organization’s environment. 
This dissertation opened with a quote from the book Inside the Boardroom (2005) 
in which authors Richard Leblanc and James Gillies suggest that we have learned 
relatively little over the last century about the ways board members make decisions.  
These respondents have provided important illumination of what happens inside the 
boardroom.  This study has also shown that there are identifiable antecedents and positive 
consequences of boards acting as strategy makers. 
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 Human capital:  
  Board experience Approximately how long (total years combined) have you 
been a member of the hospital boards you are currently 
serving on?  For example, if you have served on one 
board for 2 years and another board for 5 years, you 
would answer 7 total years combined here. 
 
Approximately how long (total years combined) have you 
been a member of the non-hospital boards you are 
currently serving on? 
 
Approximately how long (total years combined) were you 
a member of the hospital boards in the past?   
 
Approximately how long (total years combined) were you 
a member of these non-hospital boards in the past? 
 
  Work/educational
   experience 
Please indicate which one of the following best describes 
your primary functional background (if you are retired, 
please indicate your prior primary functional 
background):   
 
  a.   _____medicine  
  b. _____healthcare organization administration  
  c.   _____finance  
  d.  _____accounting  
  e.   _____marketing  
  f.   _____planning  
  g.   _____human resources  
  h.   _____law  
  i.  _____information systems  
  j.   _____general management  
  k.   _____international management  
  l.   _____public affairs  
  m.  _____religious  
  n.   _____agriculture  
  o.   _____other (please describe)  
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 Human capital:  
  Work/educational
   experience (cont.)
  
Please indicate your highest educational degree: 
 
 a.  _____less than high school 
 b.  _____high school  
 c.  _____associate degree  (major:                        )  
 d.  _____undergraduate degree (major:                 ) 
 e.  _____master degree (major:                             ) 
 f.  _____graduate degree above master:  
  (1) please specify type (M.D., Ph.D., etc.):  
   (2) please specify specialty or major area: 
 
Organizations can take different approaches to making 
changes in their products and services. What is your 
experience with these different approaches?  No approach 
is inherently good or bad.  
  
ORGANIZATION A maintains a “niche” within 
its industry by offering a relative stable set of 
products/services. Generally Organization A is not 
at the forefront of new products/services and 
concentrates instead on doing the best job possible 
in its existing arena. 
 
ORGANIZATION B maintains a relatively stable 
base of products/services while at the same time 
moving to meet selected, promising new 
product/service developments.  Organization B 
monitors the actions of other organizations that are 
“first movers” and attempts to follow with a more 
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 Human capital:  
  Work/educational
   experience (cont.) 
ORGANIZATION C makes relatively frequent 
changes in its set of products/services.  
Organization C tries to be the “first mover” with 
new products/services and responds rapidly to 
early signals of market needs and opportunities. 
 
ORGANIZATION D cannot be clearly 
characterized in terms of its approach to changing 
its products/services.  It does not have a consistent 
pattern.   
  
Which organization above is most similar to your “home” 
organization (the organization where you are currently 
employed or where you were employed before 
retirement)? 
  Organization _____ (A, B, C, or D) 
 
If you currently serve on other boards, do any of those 
organizations resemble: 
 
  a. Organization A _____  Yes  _____  No 
  b. Organization B  _____  Yes  _____  No 
  c. Organization C  _____  Yes  _____  No 
  d. Organization D _____  Yes  _____  No  
    
If you served on other boards in the past, did any of those 
organizations resemble: 
 
  a. Organization A _____  Yes  _____  No 
  b. Organization B  _____  Yes  _____  No 
  c. Organization C  _____  Yes  _____  No 
  d. Organization D _____  Yes  _____  No  
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 Social capital:  
  Networks How many other hospital boards are you currently serving 
on? 
 
How many non-hospital boards are you currently serving 
on?   
  
How many other hospital boards have you served on in the 
past? 
  
How many non-hospital boards have you served on in the 
past?   
  
I consider 50% or more of the other board members to be  
personal friends of mine (strongly disagree=1; strongly 
agree=5) 
 
How long have you been a member of this hospital board? 
 
 
  Collaborative 
   relationship with 
  CEO 
How many times per year does the full board meet? 
 
I frequently meet with the CEO to discuss hospital 
business outside of board meetings (strongly disagree=1; 
strongly agree=5) 
 
I consider the CEO to be a personal friend of mine 
(strongly disagree=1; strongly agree=5) 
 
Board members frequently offer advice to the CEO about 
important decisions (strongly disagree=1; strongly 
agree=5) 
 
The CEO frequently seeks advice from board members 
when making important decisions (strongly disagree=1; 
strongly agree=5) 
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 Board Involvement  
 in Strategy Formation 
Please think about a major strategic decision that has been 
considered at your hospital during your time on the board.  
Such a decision would have a long-term impact that affects 
the entire or very nearly the entire hospital, usually 
involves a large investment of time, money, and energy, 
and has large potential consequences.  Examples of major 
strategic decisions would be deciding to focus on cancer 
treatment by opening a cancer center or deciding to 
consolidate pediatric services with another hospital in a 
cooperative arrangement. 
 
Focusing on this example, indicate your participation in 
this decision.  Check as many of these activities as 
appropriate.  
 
 a. _____raising the issue initially  
 b. _____clarifying the issue  
 c. _____generating alternatives  
 d. _____evaluating alternatives  
 e. _____choosing alternatives  
 f. _____reviewing/questioning the CEO’s   
 recommendation 
 g. _____accepting or rejecting the CEO’s   
    recommendation 
 
 Board Focus Many would agree that hospital boards fulfill three roles: 
establishing the hospital's mission and strategic direction, 
building and maintaining external relationships, and 
overseeing the hospital's management team and 
performance.   Hospital boards can take different strategic 
approaches to their own focus and involvement when 
guiding the hospital. For example, boards can focus to a 
low, medium, or high degree on each of these roles. No 
strategic approach is inherently good or bad.  
 
How would you characterize this hospital board's focus on: 
 a.  establishing the hospital's mission and strategic direction 
  (low, medium, or high) 
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 Board Focus   b.  building and maintaining external relationships 
  (low, medium, or high) 
 c.  overseeing the hospital’s management team and  
  performance (low, medium, or high) 
 
 Performance Outcomes:  
  
  Decisions  
   implemented 
Was this strategic decision implemented by your hospital?   
  
Considering strategic decisions in your hospital generally, 
what percentage of the decisions are typically 
implemented if your hospital board participates in: 
 
  a. raising the issue initially (percentage from 0 to 
100) 
     
  b. clarifying the issue (percentage from 0 to 100) 
 
  c. generating alternatives (percentage from 0 to 
100) 
  
  d. evaluating alternatives (percentage from 0 to 
100) 
  
  e. choosing alternatives (percentage from 0 to 
100) 
  
  f. reviewing/questioning the CEO’s 
recommendation 
   (percentage from 0 to 100) 
  
  g. accepting or rejecting the CEO’s 
recommendation 
   (percentage from 0 to 100) 
 
  Financial outcomes What were the financial outcomes of the implemented 
decision on the following scale: (eleven point scale from  
-5 = negative to +5 = positive) 
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Number of Participants  30  14  44 
  
  
Number of Hospitals 
Represented 
 15  14  22 
       
Percentage of  
Hospitals in State 
 13%  12%  19% 
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Male  26  87% 
Female  4  13% 
    
Black/African American  1  3% 
White    28  93% 
Not reported  1  3% 
   
Highest Degree:   
 Associate  1  3% 
 Undergraduate  14  47% 
 Master  3   10% 
 M.D.  9  30% 
 Ph.D.    1  3% 
 J.D.  2  7% 
   
Age:   
 30-39   2  7% 
 40-49  7  23% 
 50-59  9  30% 
 60-69  8  27% 
 70-79  4  13% 
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Years on Focal Board: 





 6-10  11  37% 
 11-15  1   3% 
 16-20  0  0% 
 21-25  2  7% 
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Table 5. Participation of Board Members in Decision Stages 
 





As Strategy Makers:     
 raising issues initially  4  13% 
 clarifying issues  15  50% 
 generating alternatives  3  10% 
 evaluating alternatives  18  60% 
 choosing alternatives  9  30% 
   
As Monitors/Advisors:   
 reviewing and questioning  
 CEO’s recommendations 
 23  77% 
 accepting or rejecting  
 CEO’s recommendations 
 21  70% 
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Table 6. Financial Outcomes  
on the Scale 








-5 = very negative outcome  1 3.3% 
-4  0 0 
-3  0 0 
-2  1 3.3% 
-1  1 3.3% 
0 = neutral outcome  11 37.0% 
1  1 3.3% 
2  2 6.7% 
3  5 16.7% 
4  4  13.3% 
5 = very positive outcome  4 13.3% 
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Table 7. Percentages of Respondents Reporting Levels of Agreement 
with Statements Regarding their Relationships with the CEO 
and Other Board Members 
 
STATEMENTS ON BOARD SURVEY RESPONSE SCALEa 
 SD D N A SA 
the CEO seeks alternative viewpoints from board 
members when making important decisions 
 
 10% 3% 47% 40% 
board members participate extensively during board 
meetings by voicing their viewpoints and concerns 
 
 13% 10% 37% 40% 
board members frequently offer advice to the CEO 
about important decisions 
 
 7% 13% 50% 30% 
the CEO frequently seeks advice from board members 
when making important decisions 
 
 3% 23% 40% 33% 
I consider the CEO to be a personal friend of mine 
 
 7% 20% 47% 27% 
I consider 50% or more of the other board members to 
be personal friends of mine 
 
3% 40% 23% 27% 7% 
I frequently meet with the CEO to discuss hospital 
business outside of board meetings 
 
 37% 20% 27% 17% 
I frequently meet with other board members to discuss 
hospital business outside of board meetings 
 
3% 50% 23% 13% 10% 
I frequently see the CEO outside of board meetings in 
social activities that are not related to the hospital or my 
work 
 
7% 37% 17% 30% 10% 
I frequently see other board members outside of board 
meetings in social activities that are not related to the 
hospital or my work 
 27% 23% 43% 7% 
 
a SD = Strongly Disagree, D = Disagree, N = Neutral, A = Agree, SA = Strongly Agree 
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Table 8. Formative Latent Variables, Indicators, 









 Human capital:    
  Board   
  experience 
number of years serving 




number of years serving 
on other hospital and non-














  Work/ 
  educational 





highest educational degree 
experience with multiple 
strategic approaches as a 
result of serving on other 
boards currently and in the 
past 
 
experience with the Miles 
and Snow Defender, 
Analyzer, or Prospector 
strategic approaches in the 














   ** 
 
 






*** significant at the .001 level; ** significant at the .01 level;  
* significant at the .05 level; N.S. = Non-Significant 
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 Social capital:    
  Networks number of other hospital 
and non-hospital boards 
currently 
 
number of other hospital 
and non-hospital boards in 
the past 
 
consider 50% or more of 
other members of focal 
board to be personal 
friends 
 






























  Collaborative 
  relationship  
  with CEO 
number of formal board 
meetings per year 
 
frequently meet with CEO 
regarding hospital business 
outside of formal board 
meetings 
 
frequently offer advice to 
CEO about important 
decisions 
 
CEO frequently seeks 
advice about important 
decisions 
 
consider the CEO to be a 
























*** significant at the .001 level; ** significant at the .01 level;  
* significant at the .05 level; N.S. = Non-Significant 
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Table 9. Reflective Latent Variables, Indicators, 







 Board involvement 
 in strategic decision 
 making 
participate in raising the 
issue initially 
 
participate in clarifying the 
issue 
 
participate in generating 
alternatives 
 
participate in evaluating 
alternatives 
 



































 Board focus characterize the board 
focus on establishing the 















*** significant at the .001 level; ** significant at the .01 level;  
* significant at the .05 level; N.S. = Non-Significant 
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Table 10. Control Variables 





 Ownership Type  -.002 N.S. 
 System Affiliation -.003 
 
N.S. 
 Hospital Size -.006 N.S. 
  *** significant at the .001 level; ** significant at the .01 level;  
* significant at the .05 level; N.S. = Non-Significant 
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Table 11. Percentage of CEOs Reporting Financial Outcomes 
When Board Members are Involved in the Decision Stages 




SCALE PERCENTAGE  
OF CEOs 
participate in 
raising the issue 
initially 
-5 = very negative outcome 0 
 -4 0 
 -3 0 
 -2 0 
 -1 0 
 0 = neutral outcome 64.3% 
 1 7.1% 
 2 7.1% 
 3 7.1% 
 4 7.1% 
 5 = very positive outcome 7.1% 
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SCALE PERCENTAGE  
OF CEOs 
participate in 
clarifying the issue 
-5 = very negative outcome 0 
 -4 0 
 -3 0 
 -2 0 
 -1 0 
 0 = neutral outcome 57.1% 
 1 7.1% 
 2 0 
 3 21.4% 
 4 7.1% 
 5 = very positive outcome 7.1% 
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-5 = very negative outcome 0 
 -4 0 
 -3 0 
 -2 0 
 -1 0 
 0 = neutral outcome 50.0% 
 1 0 
 2 21.4% 
 3 14.3% 
 4 7.1% 
 5 = very positive outcome 7.1% 
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-5 = very negative outcome 0 
 -4 0 
 -3 0 
 -2 0 
 -1 0 
 0 = neutral outcome 35.7% 
 1 7.1% 
 2 14.3% 
 3 28.6% 
 4 7.1% 
 5 = very positive outcome 7.1% 
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-5 = very negative outcome 0 
 -4 0 
 -3 0 
 -2 0 
 -1 0 
 0 = neutral outcome 42.9% 
 1 14.3% 
 2 14.3% 
 3 14.3% 
 4 7.1% 
 5 = very positive outcome 7.1% 
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Table 12. Standardized Regression Weights for Paths Related to Hypotheses 
 
HYPOTHESIS PATH ESTIMATE P 
H 1 Human capital →  Involvement .804  *** 
H 2 Human capital →  Focus -.063  N.S. 
H 3 Social capital →  Involvement  .593  *** 
H 4 Social capital →  Focus -.305  * 
H 5 Human capital + Social capital →  
  Involvement 
1.397  *** 
H 6 Human capital + Social capital → 
  Focus 
-.368  *** 
H 7 Involvement →  Implemented N/A  N/A 
H 8 Involvement →  Financial Outcomes 19.399  *** 
*** significant at the .001 level; ** significant at the .01 level;  
* significant at the .05 level; N.S. = Non-Significant 
N/A = Not Available since 100% of the decisions were implemented (i.e., constant) 
  122 
 
Table 13. Means and Standard Deviations of Variables  
in the Studya 
 
VARIABLE M. S.D. 
Number of years on other boards currently  13.367 15.971 
Number of years on other boards in past  11.733 15.744 
Business-related functional work backgroundb  .533 .507 
Highest educational degreec  4.867 1.008 
Experience with strategic approaches on boardsd  1.700 1.822 
Experience with strategic approaches at home firme  1.967 .183 
Number of other boards currently  1.567 1.654 
Number of other boards in past  2.033 2.205 
Consider ≥50% of focal board members to be friendsf  2.930 1.048 
Tenure on focal board  6.130 5.144 
Number of formal board meetings per year  9.270 3.473 
Frequently meet with CEO outside of board meetingsf  3.230 1.135 
Frequently offer advice to CEOf  4.030 .850 
CEO frequently seeks advicef  4.030 .850 
Consider CEO to be friendf  3.930 .868 
Participate in raising the issue initiallyg  .130 .346 
Participate in clarifying the issueg  .500 .509 
Participate in generating alternativesg  .100 .305 
Participate in evaluating alternativesg  .600 .498 
Participate in choosing alternativesg  .300 .466 
Characterize board focus on strategic directionh  2.370 .718 
Strategic decision implementedi  1.000 .000 
Financial outcomesj  7.600 2.430 
Ownershipk  1.970 .718 
System affiliationg  .730 .450 
Sizel  258.630 148.961 
a n=30 
b business-related = 1; other = 0 
c less than high school = 1 through M.D./Ph.D./J.D. = 6 
d no experience with Miles/Snow four strategy types = 0 through experience with all = 4 
e similar to Miles/Snow “reactor” strategy = 1; otherwise = 2 
f strongly disagree = 1 through strongly agree = 5 
g no = 0; yes = 1 
h low = 1; medium = 2; high = 3 
i all decisions were implemented (constant) so cannot be computed 
j 
-5 (very negative outcome) = 1 through +5 (very positive outcome) = 11 
k non-governmental not-for-profit = 1; investor-owned = 2; governmental = 3 
l number of staffed beds 
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Table 14. Correlations Among Variables  
in the Studya 
 
VARIABLE 1 2 3 
1. Number of years on other boards currently    
2. Number of years on other boards in past  .442*   
3. Business-related functional work background  .162 .161  
4. Highest educational degree  -.123 -.078 -.800** 
5. Experience with strategic approaches on boards  .481** .265 .142 
6. Experience with strategic approaches at home firm  -.220 .069 .199 
7. Number of other boards currently  .689** .279 .120 
8. Number of other boards in past  .383* .698** .138 
9. Consider ≥50% of focal board members to be friends  -.038 -.083 -.061 
10. Tenure on focal board  .105 .439* .368* 
11. Number of formal board meetings per year  .189 .313 .151 
12. Frequently meet with CEO outside of board meetings  -.134 -.332 -.283 
13. Frequently offer advice to CEO  .136 .191 -.043 
14. CEO frequently seeks advice  .047 .341 -.043 
15. Consider CEO to be friend  -.003 -.044 -.073 
16. Participate in raising the issue initially  .372* .222 .170 
17. Participate in clarifying the issue  -.265 .009 -.134 
18. Participate in generating alternatives  -.093 .243 .312 
19. Participate in evaluating alternatives  .162 -.089 .055 
20. Participate in choosing alternatives  .128 -.092 .029 
21. Characterize board focus on strategic direction  -.063 -.073 -.177 
22. Strategic decision implementedb     
23. Financial outcomes  -.232 .155 .067 
24. Ownership  .217 .161 -.233 
25. System affiliation  -.308 -.419* -.111 
26. Size  .154 -.228 -.094 
a n=30; ** significant at the .01 level; * significant at the .05 level 
b all decisions were implemented (constant) so cannot be computed 
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Table 14. Continued 
 
VARIABLE 4 5 6 
1. Number of years on other boards currently    
2. Number of years on other boards in past    
3. Business-related functional work background    
4. Highest educational degree    
5. Experience with strategic approaches on boards  -.041   
6. Experience with strategic approaches at home firm  -.212 .073  
7. Number of other boards currently  .006 .733** -.049 
8. Number of other boards in past  .049 .518** .003 
9. Consider ≥50% of focal board members to be friends  -.302 -.336 .168 
10. Tenure on focal board  -.316 -.058 -.032 
11. Number of formal board meetings per year  -.088 .013 -.149 
12. Frequently meet with CEO outside of board meetings  .058 -.182 .039 
13. Frequently offer advice to CEO  -.196 -.305 .230 
14. CEO frequently seeks advice -.035 -.105 .230 
15. Consider CEO to be friend  -.168 -.405* .421* 
16. Participate in raising the issue initially  -.145 .175 .073 
17. Participate in clarifying the issue  .202 -.130 -.186 
18. Participate in generating alternatives  -.291 .118 .062 
19. Participate in evaluating alternatives  -.041 .205 -.152 
20. Participate in choosing alternatives  .015 .231 .122 
21. Characterize board focus on strategic direction -.025 -.097 .096 
22. Strategic decision implementedb     
23. Financial outcomes  -.107 .003 .513** 
24. Ownership  .279 .097 -.272 
25. System affiliation  .071 -.101 .308 
26. Size  .122 .120 -.021 
a n=30; ** significant at the .01 level; * significant at the .05 level 









Table 14. Continued 
 
VARIABLE 7 8 9 
1. Number of years on other boards currently     
2. Number of years on other boards in past    
3. Business-related functional work background    
4. Highest educational degree    
5. Experience with strategic approaches on boards    
6. Experience with strategic approaches at home firm    
7. Number of other boards currently    
8. Number of other boards in past  .477**   
9. Consider ≥50% of focal board members to be friends  -.097 -.268  
10. Tenure on focal board  -.098 .261 .040 
11. Number of formal board meetings per year  .189 .242 -.165 
12. Frequently meet with CEO outside of board meetings  -.165 -.320 .303 
13. Frequently offer advice to CEO  -.014 -.093 .467** 
14. CEO frequently seeks advice  .060 .183 .119 
15. Consider CEO to be friend  -.141 -.233 .601** 
16. Participate in raising the issue initially  .104 .265 -.165 
17. Participate in clarifying the issue  -.225 .108 -.129 
18. Participate in generating alternatives  -.116 .200 -.086 
19. Participate in evaluating alternatives  .326 .169 .013 
20. Participate in choosing alternatives  .398* .057 -.169 
21. Characterize board focus on strategic direction  -.123 .014 .125 
22. Strategic decision implementedb    
23. Financial outcomes  -.139 .125 -.079 
24. Ownership  .103 .153 -.461* 
25. System affiliation  -.161 -.373* .327 
26. Size  .094 -.077 -.058 
a n=30; ** significant at the .01 level; * significant at the .05 level 
b all decisions were implemented (constant) so cannot be computed 
 
 




Table 14. Continued 
 
VARIABLE 10 11 12 
1. Number of years on other boards currently    
2. Number of years on other boards in past    
3. Business-related functional work background    
4. Highest educational degree    
5. Experience with strategic approaches on boards    
6. Experience with strategic approaches at home firm    
7. Number of other boards currently    
8. Number of other boards in past    
9. Consider ≥50% of focal board members to be friends    
10. Tenure on focal board    
11. Number of formal board meetings per year  .098   
12. Frequently meet with CEO outside of board meetings  -.041 -.086  
13. Frequently offer advice to CEO  .164 .312 .385* 
14. CEO frequently seeks advice  .291 .335 .242 
15. Consider CEO to be friend  .002 -.165 .471** 
16. Participate in raising the issue initially  .358 .113 .094 
17. Participate in clarifying the issue  .185 -.273 .090 
18. Participate in generating alternatives  .716** -.026 .129 
19. Participate in evaluating alternatives  .277 .004 .110 
20. Participate in choosing alternatives  .012 .183 .189 
21. Characterize board focus on strategic direction  .052 .111 .357 
22. Strategic decision implementedb     
23. Financial outcomes  .236 -.016 .173 
24. Ownership  -.148 .543** -.075 
25. System affiliation  -.357 -.483** .059 
26. Size  -.005 -.452* .276 
a n=30; ** significant at the .01 level; * significant at the .05 level 
b all decisions were implemented (constant) so cannot be computed 
 
 
  127 
 
 
Table 14. Continued 
 
VARIABLE 13 14 15 
1. Number of years on other boards currently    
2. Number of years on other boards in past    
3. Business-related functional work background    
4. Highest educational degree    
5. Experience with strategic approaches on boards    
6. Experience with strategic approaches at home firm    
7. Number of other boards currently    
8. Number of other boards in past    
9. Consider ≥50% of focal board members to be friends    
10. Tenure on focal board    
11. Number of formal board meetings per year    
12. Frequently meet with CEO outside of board meetings    
13. Frequently offer advice to CEO    
14. CEO frequently seeks advice .618**   
15. Consider CEO to be friend .610** .423*  
16. Participate in raising the issue initially .102 .102 .031 
17. Participate in clarifying the issue -.040 -.199 -.078 
18. Participate in generating alternatives -.013 -.013 -.104 
19. Participate in evaluating alternatives .195 -.049 .016 
20. Participate in choosing alternatives .148 .061 .136 
21. Characterize board focus on strategic direction .374* .262 .262 
22. Strategic decision implementedb    
23. Financial outcomes .290 .357 .183 
24. Ownership .115 .115 -.280 
25. System affiliation -.337 -.337 .129 
26. Size -.095 .013 .133 
a n=30; ** significant at the .01 level; * significant at the .05 level 
b all decisions were implemented (constant) so cannot be computed 
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Table 14. Continued 
 
VARIABLE 16 17 18 
1. Number of years on other boards currently    
2. Number of years on other boards in past    
3. Business-related functional work background    
4. Highest educational degree    
5. Experience with strategic approaches on boards    
6. Experience with strategic approaches at home firm    
7. Number of other boards currently    
8. Number of other boards in past    
9. Consider ≥50% of focal board members to be friends    
10. Tenure on focal board    
11. Number of formal board meetings per year    
12. Frequently meet with CEO outside of board meetings    
13. Frequently offer advice to CEO    
14. CEO frequently seeks advice    
15. Consider CEO to be friend    
16. Participate in raising the issue initially    
17. Participate in clarifying the issue  .196   
18. Participate in generating alternatives  .523** .333  
19. Participate in evaluating alternatives  .120 .272 .272 
20. Participate in choosing alternatives  .385* .073 .267 
21. Characterize board focus on strategic direction  .074 .047 -.016 
22. Strategic decision implementedb     
23. Financial outcomes  .025 .084 .149 
24. Ownership  .296 .142 -.142 
25. System affiliation  -.429* -.302 -.302 
26. Size  -.092 .028 -.102 
a n=30; ** significant at the .01 level; * significant at the .05 level 
b all decisions were implemented (constant) so cannot be computed 
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Table 14. Continued 
 
 
VARIABLE 19 20 21 
1. Number of years on other boards currently    
2. Number of years on other boards in past    
3. Business-related functional work background    
4. Highest educational degree    
5. Experience with strategic approaches on boards    
6. Experience with strategic approaches at home firm    
7. Number of other boards currently    
8. Number of other boards in past    
9. Consider ≥50% of focal board members to be friends    
10. Tenure on focal board    
11. Number of formal board meetings per year    
12. Frequently meet with CEO outside of board meetings    
13. Frequently offer advice to CEO    
14. CEO frequently seeks advice    
15. Consider CEO to be friend    
16. Participate in raising the issue initially    
17. Participate in clarifying the issue    
18. Participate in generating alternatives    
19. Participate in evaluating alternatives    
20. Participate in choosing alternatives  .535**   
21. Characterize board focus on strategic direction  .520** .278  
22. Strategic decision implementedb    
23. Financial outcomes  .234 .140 .502** 
24. Ownership  .058 .237 .292 
25. System affiliation  -.339 -.263 -.221 
26. Size  .098 .040 .248 
a n=30; ** significant at the .01 level; * significant at the .05 level 
b all decisions were implemented (constant) so cannot be computed 
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Table 14. Continued 
 
VARIABLE 23 24 25 
1. Number of years on other boards currently    
2. Number of years on other boards in past    
3. Business-related functional work background    
4. Highest educational degree    
5. Experience with strategic approaches on boards    
6. Experience with strategic approaches at home firm    
7. Number of other boards currently    
8. Number of other boards in past    
9. Consider ≥50% of focal board members to be friends    
10. Tenure on focal board    
11. Number of formal board meetings per year    
12. Frequently meet with CEO outside of board meetings    
13. Frequently offer advice to CEO    
14. CEO frequently seeks advice    
15. Consider CEO to be friend    
16. Participate in raising the issue initially    
17. Participate in clarifying the issue    
18. Participate in generating alternatives    
19. Participate in evaluating alternatives    
20. Participate in choosing alternatives    
21. Characterize board focus on strategic direction    
22. Strategic decision implementedb    
23. Financial outcomes    
24. Ownership .071   
25. System affiliation -.227 -.669**  
26. Size -.016 -.206 .283 
a n=30; ** significant at the .01 level; * significant at the .05 level 
b all decisions were implemented (constant) so cannot be computed 
 























Figure 1. Conceptual Model of the Antecedents and Consequences of  















• Board experience 





• Collaborative relationship 
















































Figure 3. Conceptual Model of Hypothesized Relationships  
























Stages of Decision Making 










Figure 5. Conceptual Model of Board Focus 
Strategy Community Oversight 







Figure 6. Graphical Depiction of Hypothesis 1 







Figure 7. Graphical Depiction of Hypothesis 2 







Figure 8. Graphical Depiction of Hypothesis 3 







Figure 9. Graphical Depiction of Hypothesis 4 







Figure 10. Graphical Depiction of Hypothesis 5 







Figure 11. Graphical Depiction of Hypothesis 6 






Figure 12. Graphical Depiction of Hypothesis 7 







Figure 13. Graphical Depiction of Hypothesis 8 







Figure 14. Graphical Depiction of the Five Supported Hypotheses 
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